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VIETNAM SINCE 
LIBERATION
The following is an interview with Nguyen Khac Vien, manager of Hanoi Foreign 
Languages publications and of the review Vietnamese Studies, and one of the 
most widely known Vietnamese intellectuals outside Viet Nam itself. In it he 
discusses frankly the social and political problems faced in the difficult task of Viet 
Nam s reconstruction and economic advance following thirty years of war. The 
interview — or dialogue — was conducted by Enrica Collotti-Pischel during Vien's 
lecture tour of Italy in 1978. It was originally published in Rinascita, the Italian 
Communist Party’s popular theoretical journal. Our translation (by A.M. Elliott) is 
from the British Communist Party’s theoretical journal, Marxism Today (Feb. 
1979).
I w a n te d  to  put questions a b o u t the c a m p a ig n  
w h ich  is n o w  developing a b o u t "h u m a n  
rig h ts "  in V ie t N a m . It is im p o rta n t tha t the 
V ietnam ese revolutionaries should g ive  an 
answ er on this p oint. E v e ry  possibility of 
m obilisation and of solidarity w ith  V ie t N a m  
is affected, o b jective ly  speaking, if the m eans 
do not exist w ith  w h ic h  to  refute this 
ca m p a ign  in an effective, sincere and explicit 
w a y . W e  are speaking of the  rights of the 
people and of citizens rather than "h u m a n  
righ ts”  in the abstract. Fre n ch  new sp a p e rs 
have spoken of 8 0 0 ,0 0 0  political prisoners in 
V iet N a m . Is that true?
Note that the French journalist took care to 
qualify what he said: “ Therte are said to be 
800,000 political prisoners” , tie is protecting 
himself in advance. They always do that 
when they want to report a rumour which 
hasn’t been checked. The reader remembers 
the figure given and doesn’t remember the 
form of words used. The qualified form of 
words is forgotten and the figure remains.
A re  there political prisoners in V ie t N a m ? I 
realise that the problem  isn 't an easy one fro m
the theoretical p oint of v ie w . I should be glad 
if yo u  w o u ld  clarify the p ro b le m . It is 
im p o rta n t.
The real problem is this: the Americans 
had created in Viet Nam an army of over a 
million men and a police force of 150,000. At 
the time of the liberation all the ordinary 
soldiers and all the rank and file of the police 
force were able to rejoin their families at 
once, although among them there might to 
men who had killed, tortured, and burned 
down villages. We did this because we did not 
regard them as being directly responsible for 
what had been done. But there were some 
tens of thousands of officers who had given 
orders, for instance, that persons in 
detention were to be massacred or tortured. 
We could not set those men free immediately, 
partly because they had been given special 
training by the secret services and would 
have been capable o f organising a counter­
revolutionary network, of causing a civil war 
to break out, o f organising a new army with 
the disbanded soldiers and policemen, in 
order to launch them against us. That was 
why Ger5ld Ford, who was American
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President at that time, had said that there 
would certainly be a blood-bath*in VietNam. 
It was expected that the secret services' 
network, through those specially-trained 
officers, would unleash a civil war, which is 
always the danger which hangs over 
revolutionary forces, over any revolutionary 
force. Ford was counting on that clockwork 
device.
Furthermore, we knew that among those 
officers of the Saigon army there was a 
section which, as distinct from the private 
soldiers, had not been forcibly conscripted 
but had joined the army as a result of 
circumstances: the South Vietnamese regime 
lived on the flow of American economic and 
military aid and lived well above the level 
which the effective income of our country 
permitted. In order to live in privileged 
conditions, many people agreed to enrol as 
officers even though they were not really in 
agreement with the regime. Moreover, you 
yourself know that in the fascist period not 
all Italians were fascists, even in the 
relatively privileged classes: but certain 
orders have to be obeyed.The revolutionary 
forces must be able to distinguish between 
persons who have been ensnared by the 
social and psychological conditioning of the 
regime and can be restored to normal life, 
and the real counter-revolutionaries, the 
trained criminals. We have held the latter in 
re-education camps so as to make a thorough 
investigation of their past, so as to study 
their behaviour. To the extent that the 
investigations have proved that they can be 
restored to ordinary life they have been set 
free. Some thousands of persons now remain 
who are real counter-revolutionaries, died-in - 
the-wool criminals or persons whose position 
has not been clarified up to now.
Are these persons now being held in camps? 
Do you think that there can be a further phase 
of re-education for them? Or are they in 
prison?
This is a question which, on the one hand, 
concerns ideology and, on the other, 
concerns the general situation. There still 
exist counter-revolutionary networks 
organised by the American secret services, 
set up by the Americans in the past 20 years 
and still receiving foreign aid. They organise 
conspiracies, from time to time they murder a 
comrade, a cadre, they hoard goods, or blow 
up an office or a bridge. As long as this
situation lasts, we can't set these individuals 
free, but we do consider that to the extent that 
tension lessens it will be possible to restore 
them, too, to ordinary life. But do bear in 
mind that there have not been, and there are 
not, executions.
Side by side with this, there is the entire 
population which has been driven out of the 
villages as a result of the American bombing: 
ten million peasants were driven from the 
villages and deprived of a living. In Saigon, 
which had 500,000 inhabitants in 1954, the 
population had grown to 3,500,000 in 1975 
and all of them living on American aid: 2,000 
million dollars a year. After 1975 there was 
no more American aid. The parasitic 
economy had no possibility of continuing to 
exist and work had to be found. Only 
productive work can provide the 
wherewithal with which to live and for 
anyone who has become accustomed to 
living a parasitic life, work comes hard.
In Italy we can very well understand the 
problem of crime in an environment like 
Saigon-Ho Chi Minh City with such a vast 
population reduced to living in slums, driven 
out of a traditional rural society, dumped into 
a parasitic society and subjected for 20 years 
to calls for anti-communist violence. We are 
only too well aware of what the problem of 
outcasts is like in our own big cities, in a 
country where there has not been a war, 
where villages have not been destroyed and 
where there does moreover exist an industrial 
apparatus and broad scope for political and 
democratic participation. We can imagine the 
comparison with the cities of South Viet 
Nam. We are well aware that crime always 
has a social origin in the lack of work, the lack 
of moral and political motivation, and the lack 
of education. In Viet Nam, and especially in 
Saigon-Ho Chi Minh City, is it a case of 
"ordinary", sporadic crime? Are there, by the 
side of this ordinary, individual crime, real and 
specific criminal organisations, of a Mafia 
type for example? We know that the secret 
societies which used to be typical of the old 
Viet Nam and the old China may at one time 
have had a revolutionary character, but that 
now, almost everywhere, they have assumed 
the character of criminal organisations, 
operating in an organised way over a wide 
area.
You know that in a city like Saigon-Ho Chi 
Minh City there isn’t any industrial activity,
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or there is scarcely any. It is a city of officials, 
office workers, people employed in the 
services sector, small dealers, or gangs of 
criminals, outcasts. Already before the 
liberation there was a vast series of criminal 
organisations, black-marketeers and 
delinquents of every kind. After the 
liberation, with the disbanding of Thieu’s 
army and the cutting off of American aid, 
many members of the police and many 
soldiers, who were left in freedom but who 
remained unemployed, became bandits, 
criminals, gangsters, and naturally had no 
difficulty in finding weapons in a country 
where, at the time, when Thieu’s forces broke 
up, arms were abandoned in huge quantities, 
everywhere, on the bridges, on the streets. 
There were weapons and explosives 
everywhere. This resulted in widespread and 
unchecked criminal activities which we are 
endeavouring to put down, with some 
success.
In addition, there is- the counter­
revolutionary network which existed and 
which continues to exist, and there is also the 
network of illegal traffic: a triple network, so 
to speak. The criminals in each network 
function, sometimes in isolation, sometimes 
in a co-ordinated way. Our task in combating 
them consists in isolating them. In fact, we 
have fought them and isolated them and sent 
them to work camps. That much is certain. 
But it is also natural. There are some 
thousands of these criminals in the work 
camps.
There is also a great mass of drug addicts
— roughly about a hundred thousand. They 
are young people, often of “good family” , 
who have gone off the rails, who were 
desperate because they were forced to join 
Thieu’s army. They saw the massacres and 
didn’t understand. In that crisis they took to 
drugs, and there were in fact many drug 
addicts at the time of liberation. To the extent 
that we have been able, we have had to send a 
section of them to re-education centres, and 
in them it has been necessary, first of all, to 
cure them of their addiction, that is to say, to 
find means to alleviate the withdrawal 
symptoms.
Then there is the problem of prostitution. 
In a society like that which existed in the 
towns of the South during the war, very 
many women were forced to become 
prostitutes. As regards the re-education and
rehabilitation of prostitutes, the problem 
consists in the fact that the forced transfer of 
peasants to the towns created a society that 
was anomalous from every point of view: 
towns with millions of people, but without 
industry, without the production of real 
wealth. An enormous services sector, but a 
services sector which no longer had the 
sector of agricultural production and had 
never had an industrial sector. Because of 
this, women had to become prostitutes and it 
is difficult to find productive activity for 
them now, difficult to involve them in work 
which will effectively take them away from 
prostitution.
And this brings us back once again to the 
problem of those who used to be peasants and 
were compelled by the bombing to move to 
unproductive towns where they had no 
possibility of being absorbed into the labour 
force. Now the peasants can do nothing else 
but go back to the land. In present conditions 
only by agricultural work can they make a 
living that is adequate or good. The land in 
the South is fertile and suited to a diversity of 
crops and there isn’t the over-population 
which exists in the Delta in the North. But a 
whole series of problems arises in this 
connection. Where the villages, with their 
water systems and the condition of the soil, 
have remained more or less intact, it isn’t 
hard for the peasants to go back to them. It 
isn’t even necessary to tell them to go back; 
they go back of their own accord. But if, on 
the other hand, the villages have been 
destroyed, then it is necessary, as a 
minimum, to prepare the soil and in many 
cases to clear the mines, level the ground, 
rehabilitate the area. When new villages 
have to be created in rehabilitating an area, 
then the problem is a terrible one. It is a 
question of a poor, tropical country, with a 
high incidence of disease, with many 
problems. These are what we call the “new 
economic zones” . Hundreds of thousands of 
people have set out to create these new 
villages, with government help. But the life is 
always extremely hard. We have taken 
western journalists to see those new villages. 
In them the situation is difficult; there are 
few huts, few trees and those only just 
replanted, few services, no water supply or 
light and it is easy to present them as 
concentration camps, even if the peasants 
have gone there voluntarily and can find 
their only hope of survival in a return to the
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land. In conclusion, if we are to lump all of 
them together — the officers who are being 
help in camps, the drug addicts in the process 
of being re-educated, the prostitutes who are 
being restored to a normal life and the 
peasants who have gone back to the zones 
which were devastated or have left for the 
“ new economic zones” — then it can be said 
that there are “ 800,000 political prisoners” . 
But that is the wrong way to go about it. Why 
on earth should the peasants who have 
returned to the land rather than live like 
fugitives and outcasts, be regarded as 
political prisoners?
In this co n n e ctio n , I have a qu e stio n  to  put. 
W e  can understand perfectly w e ll the 
difficulties involved in the rehabilitation of a 
society destro yed after 3 0  years of w ar, 
guerrilla w a r and class struggle , by civtl w ar, 
and after 2 0  years of m assacres on a m ass 
scale, geno cide  and " e c o c id e ” , that is to say, 
destruction  of the ecological e n viro n m e n t. 
B u t u n d o u b te d ly  the pro b le m  of co ercion 
does exist. Is it possible to  build socialism  
w ith o u t a certain m argin  of co ercion? N o  one 
w illin g ly  accepts a hard life, distasteful w o rk . 
H a v e  th e re  be e n  d is c u s s io n s  in  th e  
V ietnam ese C o m m u n is t Party abo u t this? 
H ave there been " t w o  lin e s" on th isp ro b le m : 
o ne m ore  flexible and s lo w  and the other 
m ore  rigid and intended to  get speedy results? 
Especially w ith  regard to the  return of the 
peasants to the co un tryside  and the co ntrol of 
Sa igo n .
There is the problem o f the redistribution 
of the population over the whole of the 
country’s territory. Viet Nam’s population is 
distributed in a very uneven way and is 
concentrated in the lowlands that are suited 
to the cultivation o f rice. Here there is a 
twofold problem; there is the problem of the 
towns in the South with millions of peasants 
who were driven into the towns by the 
bombing and should go back to the villages 
or create new ones. That is the case in the 
South. But the North, too, has this problem: 
two-thirds of the region is made up of 
mountainous and hilly zones which up to 
now have not been put to use, but which are 
not unproductive. In the zones o f the 
Northern Delta a population density of 1,000- 
1,200 inhabitants per square kilometre is 
reached, in a purely agricultural zone. In the 
last 30 years of war we were not in a position 
to tackle that problem. The solution was 
delayed and there has been an enormous
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increase in population, concentrated in the 
lowlands. Itis necessary to move atleasthalf 
a million people a year from the lowland 
zones to the mountain zones, whether in the 
N orth or in the South.Ifwewantour country 
to be developed, then this movement of 
population will have to take place and use 
will have to be made of the higher zones. In 
the North we have the advantage that we 
have succeeded in conquering or, to be more 
exact, in eliminating malaria, breaking the 
cycle between malaria and its vector, that is 
to say, the mosquito. At one time, it was not 
possible to go and live in the mountains 
because of the presence of malaria, but now, 
in the North, the problem has been solved. In 
the South it is still necessary to work to solve 
it: the devastation of territory which was 
carried out by the Americans encouraged the 
spread of malaria and other diseases, and 
this is a problem which we should solve in 
order to bring about the settlement of masses 
of the population in the mountain zones of 
the South. Very fertile lands exist there, 
especially in the centre of the country, on the 
big plateaux in the interior. There are areas 
suitable for growing crops for export: coffee, 
tea and rubber. The South is suitable for the 
cultivation of many kinds of valuable crops 
which are characteristic of Viet Nam. This 
can provide a living for individuals and 
wealth for the collectivity, but sacrifices are 
needed in order to put these lands to use. It is 
also necessary to ensure for ourselves an 
international market which will provide a 
sure outlet for our products at steady prices. 
These are stem sacrifices. They demand a 
commitment to manual work in difficult 
conditions.
I am completely in agreement that the 
struggle against backwardness and poverty in 
poor countries, which have been 
impoverished by imperialist domination and 
war, exacts a very heavy price from the 
human standpoint and also a certain degree 
of coercion (which is another form of cost in 
human terms): a restriction of objective, 
material liberties. For instance, restriction of 
the freedom to move from one place to 
another and of the freedom to choose one's 
occupation. This is a price that has had to be 
paid, whether in the USSR or in China, and 
obviously also in Vietnam, which has had to 
pay a huge price in blood for its own 
liberation. Indeed, the backward countries
which have not paid that price have remained 
stationary and dependent. Could you give us 
some indication of this kind of price in human 
terms, of the specific restrictions on the 
liberty of individuals which have been 
imposed by the st r uggl e against  
backwardness?
Above all, it is a question of objective 
necessity. Man must work in order to meet 
his needs: if no industrial activity is possible 
at the moment, then he must obtain his 
living from the land, even if it is a question of 
arduous work. It is not possible to abandon 
the living which the land can provide. 
Perhaps that is a luxury which no country 
can afford. This does not mean giving up the 
cultural level. Our biggest and most 
successful effort has been that directed 
towards giving all children and young people 
seven years’ schooling. In Viet Nam, 15 
million people are studying out of 50 million 
inhabitants. Do you realise what this means 
in terms of freedom, of struggle against 
poverty and disease? But it is fair that every 
man should work, should produce.
One specific question. In China every person 
has a precise class status and a definite place 
of residence from which he cannot move 
without permission. He is a member of a 
commune and his place is within that 
collective structure, or else he works in a 
factory and has his place of residence on the 
spot, whether in town or countryside. Does 
freedom of residence, freedom of movement 
of the labour force exist in Viet Nam?
A distinction has to be made. As regards 
the place of work, that is where it is: it 
depends on availability and need and cannot 
be changed without the agreement of the 
authorities responsible for the service. As for 
residence, that is another problem, but you 
have to have something to live on where you 
live, a post to occupy. However, in the North 
people can move from one place to another 
without permission in order to visit relatives 
and to attend to private business. For 
security reasons, it is necessary to have a 
permit in order to go from the South to the 
North. There are too many people in the 
South who have been trained only for the 
purpose of hunting communists and 
destroying property belonging to socialist 
society, i t  is right to defend what we have 
built. But the problem is not one of 
“ coercion” ; it is a problem of actual
6 AUSTRAIJAN LEFT REVIEW No. 69
availability. After the liberation, my wife 
had to wait 40 days for a seat on a plane in 
order to go to Saigon so as to see her mother 
again after 30 years of guerrilla warfare. In 
order to take a train to the South, it is 
necessary to queue at the station for four 
days, and then the train travels at a speed of 
only 15 kilometres an hour, owing to the 
tracks of the secondary French railways 
which were laid in Indochina at the 
beginning of the century. It was a great 
success to get the railway going again, but its 
capacity is what it is. This is not coercion; it 
is a case of objective limitations. This has to 
be understood, but not everyone finds it easy 
to understand this. It isn’t easy for someone 
who has been living with the income of the 
ruling classes of capitalist countries, as 
happened in the case o f privileged 
individuals under Thieu’s regime.
There is another question —  more political 
and very explicit. During the whole period of 
the revolutionary struggle against the 
Americans, it was well known that the main 
burden —  military and political, in terms of 
blood, effort and political imagination —  of 
the struggle waged under the banner of the 
National Liberation Front was born by the 
communists, but the communists of Viet 
Nam: "communists of the North" and 
"communists of the South" did not in fact 
exist. This was the essential nucleus of the 
struggle and all the time the Americans were 
trying to destroy it, killing communist cadres 
and militants. On the other hand, the origins 
of the armed struggle in the South were 
actually determined by the fact that Diem's 
regime and then that of Thieu, because of a 
specific choice on the part of the Americans, 
always refused to allow the slightest room for 
any political force, mass organisation or 
autonomous institution. We well remember 
that round about 1962 the Vietnamese 
communists proposed a "political solution" 
for the South, a solution based on 
compromise between the various forces 
which would eliminate the regimes imposed 
by the Americans —  regimes which were 
actually fascist. It was certainly not the fault 
of the Vietnamese communists that the 
struggle in the South assumed the character 
of an armed struggle and that the 
communists were the leading force in that 
struggle.
Nevertheless, in weakening and unmasking
Thieu's regime and in mobilising public 
opinion throughout the world on behalf of 
Viet Nam, the voice of other political forces 
which in Diem's or Thieu's Viet Nam didn't 
find a place and were subjected to repression 
had a certain weight. I am referring to the 
"Third Force" and the Buddhists. Can you 
give us information about these forces and 
about their present fate? In the campaign 
against Viet Nam today, there is talk of 
persecution of the "Third Force" and also of 
the Buddhists, of arrests and persecution of 
monks. Can you tell us something definite 
about this? I believe it would be of great 
interest to those who worked for peace in Viet 
Nam.
It is necessary to make a general 
distinction. First of all, let us speak about the 
“Third Force” : this “Third Force” was very 
mixed. In it there were true patriots, but there 
were also agents of the CIA. It was a question 
of a very vague assemblage of groups and 
forces of a political, religious and cultural 
character. The CIA had an extremely 
extensive network in Saigon. It infiltrated in 
the most varied ways and in the most 
unexpected forms. Scarcely did some 
intellectual make a proposal, whether for an 
«rt exhibition or a chess circle, than the CIA 
ottered to finance it directly or indirectly and 
then controlled people by that means. In the 
“Third Force” there were many dubious 
personnages who wen* tied ud in various 
ways with the CIA. In this connection, it 
must be added that the CIA had even 
succeeded in infiltrating into the Resistance. 
There were cadres and militants who might 
seem to have a past that was above all 
suspicion and who thought they could 
exploit that past after the liberation, whereas 
it turned out later that they were in the 
clutches of the CIA to such an extent that 
they committed counter-revolutionary acts.
Some Vietnamese people in Paris who are not 
particularly reactionary have said to me that 
in the circles in which they move, it is 
regarded as certain that Mme Nguyen Thi 
Binh has been removed from power and has 
probably been shot, I ike other members of the 
National Liberation Front of the South. Is that 
true?
It is most certainly not true! Nguyen Thi 
Binh lives in a house which is close to my 
own home and when I waB about to leave 
Hanoi six weeks ago she was in her garden.
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She is preparing the reform of the secondary 
schools in her capacity as Minister of 
Education — it is a difficult job. It is perhaps 
the case that you in Italy entrust reforms of 
the secondary school system to people who 
have been removed from power. As for 
Nguyen Huu Tho, the president of the 
National Liberation Front, he is now in 
Algeria on an official visit to a country with 
which we have the very best of relations.
But to what extent do they count today —  the 
people of the "Third Force"?
In Viet Nam there is the Patriotic Front, 
which has embraced various political and 
social forces, communist and non­
communist, and continues to do so. For 
example, you no doubt know about the case 
of the jurist, Mme Ngo Ba Thanh. Under 
Thieu’s regime she created a movement in 
defence of the dignity of women — a 
movement which was, in fact, confined to the 
city of Saigon. Now she has dissolved that 
small movement but she has become a 
member of the leading committee of the 
Vietnamese Women’s Union and so has a far 
wider field for her political and social 
activity. Much the same could be said about 
many other patriotic intellectuals who were 
active in the “Third Force” .
But there have been, haven'tthere, sentences 
on, or trials of Buddhists —  even if they are 
counter-revolutionary Buddhists?
There have been trials and sentences, not 
on the plane of religion, worship or ideology, 
but solely on the political plane. The pagodas 
are functioning and welcome the religious 
people who visit them. Preaching is carried 
out. But there have been Buddhist priests 
who have been sentenced — priests who have 
carried out counter-revolutionary political 
activity. There has only been one important 
Buddhist priest who has been sentenced, 
because Buddhism does not have a tightly- 
knit institutional organisation. It is a 
question of individual cases at the unit level, 
whereas the number of Catholic priests who 
have engaged in organised counter­
revolutionary activities and who have been 
tried and sentenced has been larger. You 
should bear in mind the fact that Diem’s 
regime and then that of Thieu based 
themselves on the minority Catholic 
community in order to exercise full power,
and in particular in order to recruit officers 
and members of the police force. All round 
Saigon, in the belt of slums on the outskirts, 
in 1954 the fugitives from the North who 
were organised on military lines, were 
settled. You should have seen the priests who 
controlled that community, with revolvers 
stuck in their belts. I was taken on one 
occasion to the Saigon seminary and in the 
room in which the seminarists used to be 
instructed in the “arts of war” — karate, 
kung fu, etc. — they had not yet removed the 
inscription: “Faith without force is nothing” . 
Under Diem, inscriptions of that kind could 
be seen everywhere. Do you know what that 
means? The Church in the colonial world, 
and above all in Viet Nam, has not had the 
same character as in Christian countries.
One last question, and a very delicate one. 
Have there been trials of members of the 
Resistance or of communist cadres and 
leaders and have they been sentenced? Have 
there been cases in which persons who have 
not followed the party line or who sought to 
organise a political line opposed to that of the 
Party have been sentenced? I believe it would 
be very opportune if you gave us some precise 
information about this.
One can speak about old members of the 
Communist Party or about non-communist 
members of the National Liberation Front. A 
few were sentenced after the liberation and 
this happened for two reasons: there were 
people who profited from the part they had 
played in the Resistance and obtained posts 
which they subsequently used for personal 
ends, to obtain privileges for themselves, or 
else they received vast sums as bribes. There 
were people who, although they had taken 
part in the Resistance, then sought to provide 
themselves with a base in order to enrich 
themselves: they were corrupted by the 
atmosphere of Saigon. On the other hand, 
there were other individuals who were 
unmasked as counter-revolutionary agents 
only at the end of the resistance struggle and 
who had infiltrated into our ranks. Some 
com rades who had returned from 
imprisonment revealed that they had been 
denounced, even tortured, or recognised by 
other people whom they had taken for 
comrades. However, none of these persons 
has organised a faction on the basis of an 
alternative political line. There have 
certainly been many discussions on the
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political line which should he followed, but in 
the end we have reached unanimity. For 
instance, as regards the speed at which 
unification and the building of socialism 
should proceed, in the beginning there were 
comrades who maintained that there was a 
South Vietnamese bourgeoisie and that it 
was in our interests to let it develop and 
enrich itself, to make it work, to profit from 
its “expertise” before changing society. The 
fact was that in Saigon there was not a real 
bourgeoisie able to act in an autonomous 
way but only a parasitic bourgeoisie, an 
appendage of the economic system of 
American hand-outs. It was not a question of 
anything comparable with, I won’t even say 
the British or French bourgeoisie, but even 
the Italian or Indian. The Indian bourgeoisie 
does have its foundations, whatever may be 
the system of exploitation which it controls, 
but the South Vietnamese bourgeoisie had no 
economic foundations, nor even ideological 
ones. Scarcely had American aid been cutoff 
than that parasitic bourgeoisie was no 
longer able to exist.
As a result, the foundations have not 
existed for the formation within the 
revolutionary ranks of opposing factions 
and groups. That at least has been the case 
up to now. As for the future, I don’t know. In a 
few years, who can tell?
We do know, and this has been one of the 
factors making for the strength, the power of 
attraction of the Vietnamese revolution, that
—  even in the midst of big political 
discussions, not to mention major political 
clashes such as cannot fail to occur in any 
communist party that is truly alive —  all the 
contradictions have been resolved within the 
framework of a fundamental unity of line, 
without internal wounds. Tell us something in 
this connection, since it is of interest to our 
comrades and to Italian democrats.
Like all com m unist parties, the 
Vietnamese Communist Party found itself 
confronted by very complex problems right 
from the time of its birth. It is enough to think 
of the problem of uniting class struggle and 
n a t io n a l s tru g g le . How w as the 
contradiction to be resolved? There were 
comrades who went in one direction and 
comrades who went in the opposite one, but 
then, when the problem had been gone into 
more thoroughly, unity was restored. It was 
like that in 1945 and 1946 at the time when
the compromise with France was being 
arrived at. Then,-in 1954, after the Geneva 
Conference, when we had to discuss whether 
to accept the division of the country, whether 
to accept the compromise with French and 
American imperialism. In 1956, at the time of 
the agrarian reform: as you know, there were 
serious happenings, very serious differences, 
but afterwards the mistakes were rectified 
and unity was restored. So it was in 1960 at 
the time of the conflict between various 
communist parties, we had to define our 
position, make our own analysis. We 
certainly couldn’t take a little of the Soviet 
analysis and a little of the Chinese analysis: 
it wasn’t a question of “keeping oneself in a 
state of equilibrium” . The problem was that 
of establishing our own strategy, our 
international line, seeing what were the 
differences with one side and the other and 
discussing them, whether with the Soviet 
comrades or with the Chinese comrades. 
Naturally there were comrades of ours who 
leaned more to one side or more to the other. 
But, as we had worked out our line, unity was 
arrived at on those positions. Above all, at 
that time the most important problem for us 
was that of the attitude to be adopted 
towards United States imperialism; on the 
nature of United States’ imperialism and 
imperialism in general. At that time we had 
differences, now with the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, now with the 
Communist Party of China. After 1975, 
discussions opened on how to unify the 
country. At every stage we had discussions 
in the Party and in the midst of the 
Vietnamese people. Up to now, we have 
always succeeded in bringing about unity in 
such a way that following every discussion, 
while there have been comrades who were 
not able to hold responsible posts, because 
they had made mistakes, they have 
continued to engage in political activity and 
to have responsibilities in other posts. With 
us there have not been “purges” , as they say. 
This is the important thing: we have kept our 
forces intact, so as to concentrate them on 
national liberation, on reunification, on 
reconstruction. Despite the fact that there 
have occurred very complex situations, 
which have often been difficult and tense, 
and in face of which it has been necessary 
immediately to adopt a very firm attitude, we 
have not had irreparable breaches, purges. 
This I can tell you.
HOUSEWORK & 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE
Janna Thompson
I. Technology and Liberation — 
Introduction.
Technology, it is often said, has made the 
liberation of women possible. Labour-saving 
devices in the home, modern birth-control 
methods, the higher standards of living 
made possible by industrialization, have 
freed women from the more onerous 
household duties and given them a chance to 
take part in public life. Technological 
developments in the workplace — the 
introduction of office machinery is often 
cited as an example — have opened up more 
opportunities for female employment.
There is, of course, some truth in this 
popular belief. Beverly Kingston in My Wife, 
My Daughter and Poor Mary Ann describes 
washday in a middle-class Australian 
household of the last century:
From a cauldron o f boiling water the clothes 
were lifted, heavy with water and burning 
with steam, to drain before they could be 
subjected to the appropriate rinsing, 
wringing, blueing, starching, or mangling 
processes. All o f  these involved heavy lifting... 
These operations would regularly occupy one 
day in every week and were so time-consuming 
and wearing that early rising was necessary.
m
For most women in Western societies, this 
particular household sweatshop no longer 
exists. Washing machines do make washing 
easier.
Nevertheless, the popular view provides a 
distorted, misleading picture of the relation 
of technological change to traditional 
household work. One thing wrong with this 
thesis is that it suggests that women are 
biologically shackled to childbearing and
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home duties, and require a technological 
crutch — provided generously by scientists 
and engineers — to free them. Those who 
hold this view are unaware of, or ignore, the 
important economic roles women have 
played in many pre-industrial societies. (2)
A more serious problem with the 
conventional thesis is that it takes a narrow 
view of technology. What it counts as 
technological are the machinery and 
processes that are the results of scientific 
research and industrial production (like the 
micro-wave oven or the pill). But women had, 
and still have, methods of birth control that 
were used long before ‘scientific’ devices were 
developed and marketed by drug companies. 
Women had, and still have, methods of food 
preparation and skills in using materials 
which are properly regarded as technological 
skills. But skills which aren’t products of the 
industrial-scientific system tend to be 
overlooked or discounted.
Thus we tend to think of technology as 
something that comes from outside: 
something developed by scientists or 
engineers and offered  for sale as 
commodities. The modern conveniences 
which are supposed to have freed the 
housewife are products of this sort.
Housewives are consumers of this 
technology, not the creators or developers of 
it. They buy it, use it, but they don’t make the 
decisions about ho w and whether it should be 
developed. The role of women, in general, in 
the development of industrial and scientific 
technology has been marginal. Women work 
in factories and offices, as lab workers, less 
often as low level managers, rarely as top 
level managers, technicians and scientists. 
(3)
In their discussion of the technology of 
fertility control, Hilary Rose and Jalna 
Hanmer warn us that it is a mistake to think 
of technology as neutral, as a law unto itself. 
Technological and scientific developments 
are socially conditioned; they are affected by, 
and often rein force, certain socia l 
relationships. When examining a particular 
development, it is wise to ask: What people 
make the decisions about how it is 
developed? What priorities do they have? 
What are the effects on the status, wellbeing, 
health of those who use it? What kind of work 
is provided by it? Is it work that increases or
decreases the workers’ autonomy and sense 
of worth? Does it tend to challenge or 
reinforce existing social arrangements? 
When the answers to these questions are 
examined, a technology which, at first, 
appears to be liberating, may turn out to 
have hidden implications which are far from 
beneficial. It may provide an easier and more 
efficient way of doing a particular piece of 
work at the cost of boredom, mental strain, 
dissatisfaction and a greater feeling of 
powerlessness and loss of confidence.
In the workplace, modem industrial 
technology and methods of organising work 
have tended to decrease workers’ autonomy 
and decision-making power, devalue and 
destroy their skills, making work less 
satisfying. (4) In a paper produced for the 
Melbourne Working Women’s Centre, Linda 
Rubenstein shows how computers and 
modern office machinery have this effect on 
women office workers.
How has technology affected women’s 
work in the home? Beverly Kingston argues 
that housework has been similarly deskilled 
by industrial technology and labour-saving 
devices. She suggests that the devaluation of 
work typically done by women has led to the 
devaluation of women in general, and to the 
sexist view of women in general, and to the 
sexist view of women as having chiefly 
ornamental value.
An ability to sew, cook, raise poultry, 
preserve and make jam, or grow fruit and 
vegetables, no longer constituted an economic 
advantage or make a desirable wife. The plain 
girl with skills as a dairymaid or seamstress 
had been thought a ‘good catch’ , now plain 
girls had no skills and only their plainness 
was relevant to their marriage prospects. 
Even after marriage, whereas once there had 
been a long, very busy and creative set of 
opportunities, now shopping was about the 
m ost creative and absorbing activity 
available. (5)
I believe that Kingston exaggerates the 
extent to which housework has become 
unskilled labour. But since the industrial 
revolution began, housework has been 
changing, and this has affected the way in 
which this work is valued and the attitudes 
that those who do this work have toward 
their job. These affects are not always so 
liberating or favourable to women as many 
people have assumed.
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The question of how technological changes 
have affected women’s- work is a big and 
largely unexplored topic. In what follows I 
am concentrating mainly on the effect of 
changes in technology on housework — 
changes in the way tech n olog ica l 
development happens as well as changes in 
the products of technology. Even this is too 
much for one paper, and I am aware that 
much of it is speculation backed up by 
inconclusive arguments and inadequate 
empirical evidence. I regard it as the 
beginning of a discussion.
II. Housewifery — Old Technology 
and New.
Once upon a time, a farmer complained to 
his wife that her work in the house was much 
easier than his work in the fields. To settle the 
matter, they agreed to swap jobs for one day. 
Left with the housework, the farmer promptly 
made a mess of everything he touched. He 
slopped the contents of the churn over the 
floor; he let the fire under the stew go out; the 
washing fell into the dirt; the cow kicked over 
the milk bucket; and when his wife came home 
from the fields (there is no record that she had 
any problems), she found her child screaming, 
and her husband engaged in a desperate 
struggle with the goat on the thatched roof of 
the cottage.
Traditional story.
Properly understood, the moral is not that 
men shouldn’t do women’s work, but that 
housewifery is a skill, and no one can expect 
to do it satisfactorily without training.
But the story is about ‘olden times’. Today, 
it might be argued, that housework has been 
simplified by modern conveniences to the 
point that any idiot can do it. You don’t have 
to chum butter or milk the cow, because the 
milk and butter can be bought at the milk 
bar. You don’t stoke the wood-burning stove; 
you turn the switch on the gas or electric 
oven. Clothes and dishes can be washed in 
the automatic washer, and convenience 
foods (according to the adverts) make 
cooking a matter of heating and stirring.
Some of the things women used to do at 
home have been taken out of the home into 
the production lines of the factory. The rest 
has been au tom ated  by m odern  
conveniences. No wonder being "just a 
housewife” doesn’t rate very high as an 
occupation.
This picture of modern housework is too 
simple. First of all, it gives the wrong reason 
for the low status of the job. Many feminists 
have argued (I think, correctly) that the main 
reason work in the home is so poorly 
regarded is that it is carried on in private for 
no wages; it is not part of the world of work, 
as this is usually understood, and is therefore 
invisible. Becoming a more creative 
houseworker — making your own bread, 
sewing your children’s clothes — is not going 
to change this. In any case, men who like to 
think of themselves as the family providers, 
and gain status from being able to keep their 
wives at home, have a stake in depreciating 
the economic contribution made by the 
housewife. (6)
It also underrates the skills that 
housewives have to possess in order to do 
their work well. Anyone who has had 
housework suddenly thrust on her (or him) 
without much preparation knows that 
housework requires skill — even when the 
special problem of childcare is excluded. A 
large component of housework is organizing 
tasks so that things get done when they have 
to be done. However tedious housework 
might be for many people, it seems to me that 
there is a qualitative difference, as far as skill 
and use of judgement is concerned, between 
housekeeping and working at a machine in a 
factory or on an assembly line — jobs which 
in the world of work count as skilled or semi­
skilled.
What has modem household technology 
(7) done for housewives? it has made 
particular tasks less physically demanding
and less time-consuming. No more Victorian 
washdays. But oddly (and contrary to 
popular belief) it hasn’t reduced the amount
of time housewives spend doing housework. 
A number of studies have pointed this out. (8)
The reason for this is not clear. Some 
researchers believe that housewives obey 
Parkinson’s Law — that women fill in the 
available time by doing their work more 
slowly and inefficiently, or by doing 
unnecessary chores. My own experience 
suggests that the amount of housework has 
not decreased because housework standards 
have risen; and that household technology 
has beenlargely responsible for this rise in 
standards. (9)
When new technology is introduced into 
the workplace, the factory worker’s job may, 
in one sense, become simpler. The new 
technology is likely to require less skill to 
operate. On the other hand, she/he will now 
be expected to increase her production rate. 
The time and effort saved by the machine 
will not benefit her.
Something similar seems to happen with 
housework. Washing machines makes it 
possible to wash clothes more quickly. The 
more you wash your family's clothes, the 
cleaner they will be. The higher standard of 
cleanliness you can achieve becomes a 
necessity, something you must achieve if you 
are to count as an adequate housewife.
There are, of course, important differences 
between the way in which technology raises 
the standards of household production and 
the way in which it raises the standards of 
production in a factory. In the household, 
women are working for their families, and 
the standardsJiave to do with the Quality of 
worK, not the quantity of goods that can be 
turned out. For the factory worker, the 
standards are set by the employer and the 
sanctions for not fulfilling them are clear. In
the case of the housewife, it is not clear who 
sets the standards or imposes the sanctions. 
Husbands may do so, but they also may care 
less than their wives about how the house is 
kept. But this doesn’t mean that housewives 
set their own standards (as people who say 
that housewives make work for themselves 
are implying). Community standards exist, 
though they differ somewhat for different 
classes and localities. Children are aware of 
them; so are neighbours. They’re publicised 
by the media, exhibited in advertising. (10) 
Some women ignore these standards, but few 
are unaware of them and many feel that their 
worth depends upon measuring up. Labour 
which seems to an outsider to be dispensable, 
may, in the social context, be necessary.
in the same way, household appliances 
change from luxuries to necessities as they 
become embedded into a way of life. Mixers, 
blenders, mincers, juicers, etc., make more 
elaborate cooking feasible; the new 
standards which such cooking brings into 
existence in turn creates a demand for such 
utensils. The woman who doesn’t own them 
soon finds herself at a disadvantage. Even 
people who adopt simpler styles of life don’t
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escape this problem. A popular book 
promoting a low energy life-style and 
vegetarianism, Diet for a Small Planet, 
contains large numbers of recipes which call 
for the use of a blender. Some cooking books 
assume that the cook has an electric mixer, 
just as the directions of many products 
assume the existence o f a household 
refrigerator.
If modern appliances do save the 
housewife time on some tasks, she is likely to 
spend whatever time she gains attending to 
the needs of her children. Again my 
impression is that the standards for 
childcare have also risen, at least in middle- 
class households. Since the war, there has 
been an extraordinary amount of popular 
literature on the needs of young children, on 
the crucial importance of the child’s early 
years. A mother who doesn’t spend a 
considerable amount of time concentrating 
on the children is likely to be regarded, and 
regard herself, as a poor mother.
What else has household technology done 
for women? Kingston and others suggest 
that it enabled middle-class women to do 
without servants and married women to 
enter the workforce. But the relationship 
between improvements in household 
technology and the ability of women to work 
outside the home is not a clear one. Whether 
or not married women work outside the home 
probably has more to do with the type of 
labour available and the needs of industry, 
and the financial requirements of the family 
than the introduction of household 
technology — or even modem methods of 
birth control. During the times when women 
are being discouraged from working outside 
the home, household technology is presented 
as something which can make a women into 
a better housewife. The standards can 
always be raised. In Britain in 1924, an 
organisation called Electrical Association 
for Women was founded to promote the 
liberatory implications of the new ‘electric 
household’. This was at a time when 
occupations outside the home were opening 
up to women. The organisation still exists, 
but now pronounces that its aim is ‘to 
educate women so that they can become 
useful and e ffic ien t in the hom e’ . 
Technology, by itself, won’t make us free.
III. Deskilling of the Houseworker.
Kitchens, pantries, was h houses and dairies 
were workshops for colonial housewives. 
There were few things they could not do and 
make. They kept the kitchen range and stove 
black and shining with their own mixture of 
black lead, blue stone, turpentine and 
methyl ated spirit. They made butter in elegant 
cherry wood chums and their families enjoyed 
that lost delicacy, fresh buttermilk. They 
made their own soap with saltfree fat, caustic 
soda and resin, setting it in flat boxes lined 
with wet cloth.... They made their own 
cleaning pastes, their own sand soap, their 
polish for harness, using turpentine, beeswax, 
white of egg and black or brown colouring. 
They took on the hard work o f tanning and 
dyeing sheepskin mats for floors and 
sheepskin coats for their menfolk.
They smoked hams in deep pits; they 
preserved eggs in a mixture of water, slaked 
lime and salt. They made their own vinegar, 
their ginger beer and hop beer. They made 
cider, and perry, a pleasant pear drink, 
raspberry vinegar and home-made cordials; 
their pantry shelves were stacked with jams, 
pickles, sauces and they very early began 
bottling fruit in mason jars without the benefit 
o f a professional outfit and thermometer.
Joan Gillison: A Colonial Doctor and His Town.
Gillison presents the 19th century country 
housewife as a craftswoman — a mistress of 
the technology of household production. Tne 
work she describes, it is true, was done by 
women in an isolated country town 
(Mansfield, Victoria). City housewives of 
that period would probably not have made 
their own soap or tanned sheepskins. 
Nevertheless, as Kingston also suggests, 
Australian housewives of the last century 
practiced a wide variety of technical skills 
which have since altered or become 
unnecessary. These skills were passed on 
from mother to daughter, were not written 
down except in a cursory fashion. Kingston 
notes that earlier recipes were little more 
than a list of reminders:
A light biscuit: half a pound o f flour, three 
ounces of butter or fresh lard; two ounces of 
sugar, one egg, half a teaspoonful of volatile 
salt (11)
One important feature of the household 
technology that Gillison describes, is that it 
was controlled and developed by the
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housewives themselves. Women were in the 
same positions, in respect to the technology 
they used as pre-industrial craftsmen and 
women. The glassblowers and iron smelters, 
etc., of the pre-industrial society had a 
practical knowledge of the materials they 
handled. They developed their skills and 
knowledge long before anyone had a 
scientific understanding of the materials 
and processes involved (just as housewives 
knew that scalding milk prevents disease 
long before Pasteur explained why this is so). 
The development and application of the 
technology was in their hands.
What changed this situation was the 
industrial revolution and the growing bond 
between science and technology, which both 
stimulated and was stimulated by the 
industrial revolution. Iron and glass 
production is now done in large, highly 
mechanised factories, in which work is 
organised in a hierarchy of skills and 
responsibilities. Technological innovations 
are generally the responsibility of the 
scientists, often working closely with the 
managers of the industry. Most of the 
workers have little knowledge and no control 
over the development and application of the 
technology.
Something like this has happened with 
household technology, though the change 
has been much more gradual and complex. It 
has not eliminated housewifery in the way it 
has eliminated most of the traditional crafts. 
But it has, to a large extent, taken the control 
of the technology away from women who do 
the work. The goods are produced in the 
factory where women participate mainly as 
factory hands. Or they are produced in the 
home using machines, chemicals and 
equipment which are the result of technical 
and industrial processes which housewives 
themselves do not control and generally do 
not understand. Thus, in an important sense, 
housewives have been deskilled by modem 
technology. They have lost control of much 
of the technology that has traditionally 
belonged to their sphere of work.
This does not mean that housework has 
become unskilled labour. As well as the 
technical skills that I mentioned earlier, 
women in the home are expected to have 
other abilities — not properly called
technical — such as the ability to care for 
ch ild re n  and to m an age  fa m ily  
relationships. On these matters, women are 
the experts. There are, it is true, outsiders 
who speak on childcare and human relations 
with the authority that their status as 
academics or psychologists give them. But 
there is an important difference between the 
relation of the homeworker to these experts 
and her relation to the technological experts. 
First of all, their area of expertise is a shaky 
one (compared to the entrenched position of 
the scientist or engineer). There are 
differences of opinion among them, and 
much has to be left to the woman’s own 
judgement. No matter how carefully a 
mother (or father) reads Dr. Spock, there are 
still many situations in which they have to 
exercise ‘common sense’ based on their 
experience and practical knowledge. In any 
case, the outside experts can only advise; 
they can’t control the way the housewife does 
these things. Women aren’t licensed to 
become housewives or mothers.
People have contradictory views of 
women’s work in the home. On one hand this 
work is pictured as a matter of pushing 
buttons and turning dials — a mindless 
procedure which has necessity as its only 
virtue. On the other hand, work women do at 
home is also regarded as a heavy 
responsibility — so awesomely difficult that 
many people worry that the average 
housewife is not up to performing it. That is, 
it is admitted that important skills are still 
largely in women’s hands. It has not been 
institutionalized: no formal apprenticeship 
is required, no particular degree or diploma. 
And it is not adequately captured by any 
scientific or technical discipline. And 
therefore it is counted as unskilled, and doing 
it gives a woman no qualifications for doing 
anything else. (12)
IV. Technological rationality
As a retired philosophy professor with 
nearly 40 years of teaching college students, I 
am firmly convinced that biologically males 
are superior in reasoning to females. I can 
recall fewer than a dozen girls who showed 
real ability or interest in logic and related
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fields, but there were scores of boys who were 
extraordinarily gifted in this area.
Letter in Smithsonian, 
December, 1977.
The observations on which the professor 
rests his fallacious conclusion are probably 
correct. Few’women choose to specialise in 
logic or mathematics. They also tend to avoid 
the related areas o f science and engineering. 
They are rarely found in the technical 
professions, except those like nursing, which 
are labelled as ‘women’s work’.
For most women, the technology of the 
motor, the electrical circuit, the transistor, 
the computer, the jet, the nuclear power 
station belong to an alien world. Boys are 
early initiated into the mysteries of this 
realm. They are encouraged to play with 
mechanical toys, take things apart; become 
interested in tinkering with pushbikes, then 
with motor cycles and cars, Some boys follow 
up these interests in their education by 
becoming mechanics, electricians, etc., or go 
to university and become engineers or 
scientists. Girls do not usually go through 
the initiation process; it’s a man’s world, and 
the occupations are male occupations.
So women, by and large, grow up 
surrounded by machines, chemicals, 
processes which they don’t understand. In 
the home, a woman is surrounded by 
appliances which she had no part in 
designing, the workings of which she doesn’t 
know anything about. If a machine goes 
wrong, she is helpless.
Men are in a different position. It is true 
that many men don’t know how to fix their 
cars, can’t deal with the vacuum cleaner 
when it stops working. It’s also true that a lot 
of new technology is too complicated for 
anyone but the experts to understand in 
detail. (13) But nevertheless, these 
mechanisms belong to a man’s world. In the 
simple cases, men generally have some idea 
how they function; if they can’t deal with 
more complex problems or technologies, this 
is only because they’ve never bothered to get 
the relevant training or experience.
Women do not only not understand 
mechanical things, but in many cases feel 
that they aren’t capable of understanding 
them. The mysteries of these matters are at 
the same time beneath and beyond us. A man 
explains, perhaps in a rather patronizing
way, why your car won't start, but you won’t
listen. You know you won’t understand; you
don’t want to try to understand. Robert
Pirsig in Zen and the Art o f Motorcycle
Maintenance describes the combination of
helplessness and disgust with which two 
friends {in this case both a woman and a 
man) regard mechanical matters. Pirsig 
believes that this kind of alienation limits 
personal development; for this reason he 
learned to fix his own motorbike.
Women too have skills which they are 
thought to have a natural aptitude for. And 
many men have corresponding feelings of
unease and disgust when confronted with 
‘women’s work’. But the way in which our 
society, regards those abilities that are 
assigned to women is very different from the 
way in which it regards competence which 
belongs to the male sphere. The traditional 
skills of men and women are separate but not 
equal.
It is common to try to explain why 
technology, science, most mechanical arts 
are largely matters for men, by reference to 
male/female biological differences. For 
instance, Hutt and Gray, in an influential 
study noted that men on average do better 
than women at tests having to do with 
spatial skills, and argue that this is the result 
of innate biological programming which 
gives men an advantage in fields such as 
maths, science, mechanics, and engineering. 
Women, according to this view, are unsuited 
to participate in what our society regards as 
the m ainstream  o f  tech n olog ica l 
development.
There are many criticisms that can be 
made of this hypothesis and the research 
which is supposed to have established it. (14) 
At most, Hutt and Gray’s hypothesis says 
that on average men will do better than 
women at subjects and fields requiring 
spatial skills. It does not explain why nearly 
all women are excluded from these areas. So 
even if the hypothesis were true, further 
explanation would be needed for women’s 
marginal participation in mainstream 
technological development.
In Origin of the Family, Private Property 
and the State, Engels speculated that the 
“ world historical defeat of the female sex” 
occurred “when the tasks connected with 
man’s sphere — care of flocks and fields —
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came to overshadow in economic importance 
women’s household work (something that 
happened when private property came into 
being). This hypothesis ignores the role that 
women in traditional societies play in 
agricultural production. But something like 
Engel’s hypothesis may help explain 
women’s relation to technology: one of the 
most important features o f modern 
technology is its dependence on science. 
Scientific research has always been a male 
affair.
The women and men who practiced 
traditional crafts had neither the leisure nor 
the education to work toward a scientific 
comprehension of their operations. When a 
scientific understanding of these technical 
skills w as achiev ed, it was the work of people 
of another class. The scientists of the 17th, 
18th and even the 19th centuries were 
gentlemen of means (or were patronized by 
the wealthy) whose university education 
made them familiar with the scientific and 
philosophical tradition and who had the 
leisure and the resources to conduct 
experiments and carry on correspondence.
A few women had the leisure for such 
activities, but almost none had the 
education. Universities, until the latter part 
of the 19th century, were closed to women, 
and even afterwards science was regarded as 
an unsuitable course of study for a woman. 
Women didn’t do science. And soon it became 
common to believe that women couldn’t do 
s c ie n c e . The a b i l i t ie s  to rea son  
dispassionately, to analyse, to use logic (it 
was said) belong to men, and it is just these 
abilities that are required for science. (15) So 
a woman who wanted to study a science not 
only had to overcome the usual prejudices 
against educated women, but also had to 
fight against the prevailing idea that women 
were constitutionally unfit to be scientists.
It is remarkable that the men particularly 
noted for their depth of thought and their 
scientific or philosophical achievements — 
e.g., Newton, Kant, Descartes, Darwin, Marx
— either had no families to worry them, or 
managed to retire into the study or the 
library for large amounts of time. Virginia 
Woolf argues that to be a creative woman you 
need some money and a room of your own. To 
be a scientist you also need large amounts of 
peace and quiet and a long and intensive 
education, and contacts with the scientific
community. It is possible for a woman to 
write good novels at home without a training 
in literature, in intervals between taking care 
of family needs. It is not possible for anyone 
to do s c ie n ce  in th is  w ay . The 
institutionalization of knowledge and skills 
nearly always works to the disadvantage of 
women.
When scientists were able to explain 
theoretically the processes involved in 
traditional technology, then the possibility 
opened up of making alterations and 
innovations in this technology throu gh 
scientific understanding. Becoming an 
expert in a craft began to mean obtaining a 
scientific or technical training at an 
institution. In some cases the skills and their 
theoretical background were incorporated 
into the university curriculum: medicine was 
first; engineering became a university 
discipline in parts of Europe in the 19th 
century. In other cases, special technical 
institutes provided the training and 
certification.
Women Una it much more difficult than 
men to satisfy formal requirements for an 
occupation. The more sophisticated — and 
longer — the training the more at a 
disadvantage a women will be. It is well 
known that women have a more difficult 
time getting to tertiary institutions and a 
still more difficult time staying there for any 
length of time. In any case, becoming a top 
person in a scientific field, becoming one of 
the elite who designs, innovates, and 
manages, requires a total commitment of 
time and energy which most women are 
unable to give. In a hierarchical system of 
work where position depends on formal 
qualification and uninterrupted service, 
women tend to sink to the bottom.
Another feature of modern technology is 
that its most awe-inspiring visible 
achievements have been in areas which are 
usually considered male domains. Large- 
scale industry, mining, metal working, the 
military, transportation — this is where the 
money for research goes; this is where the 
results are achieved.
The development of modern science has 
always gone hand in hand with the 
development of technology associated with 
activities which are almost exclusively male. 
The mechanics, of the 17th century, which is
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now regarded as the beginning of modem 
science, was stimulated, and in turn 
stimulated, the technology of mining, 
construction, navigation, military operation. 
The new science, applied with so much 
success in these areas, gave rise to a 
metaphysical world picture. The heavens, 
living things, even human beings, came to be 
seen as objects operating according to the 
laws of motion. The kind of technological 
and scientific development characteristic of 
Western society has been mainly an attempt 
to develop and apply this picture of how 
things work. Skills, practices and world 
views which didn’t fit this picture were taken 
over, denigrated or dism issed as 
superstitutions. This probably happened to a 
number of skills and technical practices 
traditionally carried on by women.
Barbara Ehrenreich and Deidre English in 
Witches, Midwives and Nurses recount how 
work that belonged to women, even into the 
19th century, namely healing, was wrested 
away from them by professional medical 
associations, which is one way or another 
excluded women. The authors stress that the 
doctors got control of medical practice not 
because they were better healers — in the 
early days, at least, this was not so — but 
because they had the universities, the 
scientific establishment, and eventually the 
law on their side. Women were largely 
relegated to subordinate service roles in 
medicine.
It is important to see this, not j ust as a male
takeover, but as the replacement of one kind 
of technology and outlook with another. (16) 
One reason the doctors had the universities 
and the scientific establishment on their side 
is because they were working in the 
framework of the accepted scientific world 
picture. They were the scientists, and the 
midwives and herbalists were practising 
superstitution.
Women’s traditional work is still being 
colonized by industrial and scientific 
technology. The position of the housewife in 
relation to technology is something like that 
of the peasant of a pre-industrial society. In 
the name of progress, products of modem 
industry are thrust upon her, sometimes by 
well meaning experts, more often by people 
in search of a profit. The benefits of this new 
technology are lauded; the costs are seldom 
recognized. On the other hand, experts will 
sometimes admit that many skills women 
practice have not been adequately 
comprehended by modern science or reduced 
to a technological process (just agronomists 
seomtimes have to admit that peasants may 
make better judgements about their land 
than the experts do). Nevertheless, there is 
an arrogant assumption that in the end 
modern science and technology will take 
over these remaining outposts of traditional 
knowledge. Houseworkers and peasants will 
be incorporated more completely into the 
industrial-technological machinery o f
modern society.
18 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 69
The behavioural psychologist B. F. 
Skinner, for example, looks forward to the 
day when children can he scientifically 
conditioned using the latest behavioural 
technology, rather than the ‘unscientific’ , 
‘inefficient’ methods of teaching now 
employed by parents. His idea of progress is 
to take from the parents — which means, 
primarily, the mother— the decision-making 
and judgement now associated with 
childrearing. This will pass into the hands of 
the scientifically trained expert; the mother’s 
or father’s job will be to follow the 
instructions.
Skinner’s ideas about how humans learn 
have been strongly criticised. There are 
philosophical as well as practical difficulties 
in applying the scientific world picture — so 
successful in explaining the motions of water
— to the behaviour of human beings. 
Nevertheless, itseldom occurs to experts that 
ordinary people who have had practical 
experience and insights derived from this 
experience could contribute to the store of 
human knowledge — especially if these 
people are housewives. The practice of the 
housewife is dismissed as a low-level skill or 
a matter of instinct; her insights are derided 
as ‘woman’s intuition’. What she does or 
thinks has nothing to do with what is 
grandly labelled ‘human knowledge’.
V. Conclusion
The inability of women to have some 
control over or participate in mainstream 
technological development tends to get 
worse rather than better. There is a tendency 
for technology to become more complex, to 
require for its maintenance and development 
highly specialized training in science, 
mathematics, or engineering.
What we must do, say many people who are 
concerned about the small number of women 
who participate in the development of 
technology, is to encourage more girls to 
obtain a scientific and technological 
education. Such a programme would not help 
the women who do not have, and are not 
likely to get, a tertiary education of any kind; 
it won’t do much to enhance the status or 
increase the confidence of the houseworker. 
Further, it is unlikely that, given the 
disadvantages that women suffer, women 
will ever be proportionately represented in
scientific and technological elites — unless 
the position of women in society changes 
drastically.
But apart from these problems, the 
proposed remedy is inadequate in a more 
basic way. It fails to question the division of 
labour between the scientific-technological 
elite and the ordinary person, the cult of the 
expert, the centralization, vulnerability, and 
sometimes threatening nature of the 
technology developed by bureaucrats and 
capitalists, the way science is practised and 
the directions research has taken. More 
radical criticisms of the present state of 
science and technology are beginning to be 
made, but the alternative is far from clear.
What I think women should do, whether 
they have had a scientific education or not, is 
to bring a feminist perspective to the critique 
of science and technology and to the search 
for alternative technology. The danger is 
that the discussion and design of these 
alternatives may be left entirely to men, 
particularly those who are already scientists 
or engineers, with the result that the ‘new’ 
technology will be as elitist, male-dominated 
and male-oriented as the old.
I am not suggesting that the present sexual 
division of technical labour is a good thing. 
Human potential is limited by the sex-typing 
of skills and characteristics. One thing that 
is wrong with many present-day attempts to 
find new life-styles is that they don’t 
question this division. Women are supposed 
to return to the household skills and crafts of 
the past: breadmaking, spinning, etc.; the 
men plan and design the important 
technology. What is needed is an alternative 
which enables women to play a creative role 
in the development of all aspects of social life
— not a return to the Victorian kitchen, and 
not our present position as passengers on a 
ride to a technologically created nightmare.
* This paper was given at the Women and 
Labour Conference, May 1978, and was 
originally published in Part 2 of the 
Conference Papers.
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ECONOMIC 
NOTES
If there is one single theme that continues 
to run through the Fraser government’s 
approach to economic policy, it is that real 
wages in Australia are too high and profits 
are too low. Economic recovery and a 
reduction in unemployment can only come 
about when the share of output going to wage 
and salary earners has been sufficiently 
reduced, the government argues.
As well as consistently pursuing this 
policy before the Arbitration Commission, 
the government is also applying it to its own 
workers and attempting to discipline 
individual firms which, for the sake of 
industrial peace, feel it is in their interests to 
grant more to their own workers than the so- 
called wage indexation “ guidelines” allow. 
The crusade is to get the profit share back to 
the value it had in some (ill-defined) golden 
age.
Is there anything in this position?
Real Wages: Level or Share?
Before looking at the evidence it is 
necessary to sort out some confusion in the 
debate about real wages. For a start, there 
are two ways of looking at wages in real 
terms. The first is the level of real wages; 
that is, the purchasing power of the wage — 
or, what is the same thing, the money wage 
divided by some consumer price index.
Now there is argument about how this 
measurement should be carried out, but most 
of it is of a technical nature. Which of the 
available measures of wages should be used? 
Which price index most accurately reflects 
what is really happening to the prices wage 
earners pay? These are important questions, 
particularly if there is a redistribution of
income going on within the group of wage 
and salary earners at the same time as there 
is a shift of resources away from this group 
as a whole towards profit-receivers. 
However, the main controversy at the 
moment is about this latter shift.
The share of national income going to 
profits can increase even if the level of real 
wages remains constant — so long as 
national income itself increases. In an 
economy expanding at, say five per cent a
Table 1. Gross non-farm product at 
constan t (19 74 /5 ) prices, sea son a lly  
adjusted, percentage increase on previous 
quarter.
Quarter
Percentage
increase
September 1975 — 1.04
December 1975 -  1.39
March 1976 2.96
June 1976 0.41
September 1976 2.13
December 1976 0.92
March 1977 — 0.45
June 1977 0.58
September 1977 1.28
December 1977 — 0.74
March 1978 2.27
June 1978 — 0.06
September 1978 0.49
December 1978 1.51
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year, real wages and real profits must both 
increase by this five per cent gain in 
productivity if the existing shares of 
national income are to be maintained. If the 
level of real wages is held constant, all this 
increase in productivity accrues to profits, 
and so the profit share increases rapidly. 
Naturally, if the level of real wages also 
falls, the profit share can increase even more 
rapidly.
A more or less painless way exists, then, 
for governments to increase the profit share 
in an expanding economy. Real wages have 
to be held constant (or at least increase less 
rapidly than productivity) so that the 
benefits of greater production go to profit- 
receivers. This is the effect of an equitably 
administered system of full wage (and tax) 
indexation.
If, however, the economy is not expanding 
very rapidly this shift to profits will be slow. 
A system of full indexation, as envisaged by 
the Labor government in 1975, would have 
increased the profit share but too slowly for 
those who stood to benefit, since the economy 
was, and has remained, stagnant — as Table 
1 illustrates.
In the period covered by Table 1, Gross 
non-farm product grew at an average annual 
rate of only about three per cent per year, 
compared to an average of 5.7 per cent in the 
previous eight years. To quickly increase the 
profit share in such circumstances required 
an actual reduction in real wages. Has this 
been achieved?
The most commonly used measure of 
wages in Australia is the quarterly Average 
Weekly Earnings (AWE) series, which is 
derived by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics from payroll tax returns. Despite 
its limitations (it includes, for example, the 
earnings of managerial and executive staff, 
and even directors’ fees) it is our best regular 
and more or less complete report of wage and 
salary incomes, and is the measure I have 
used here.
If, for each quarter, we discount the 
increase in Average Weekly Earnings by the 
Consumer Price Index we obtain a series of 
quarterly changes in the level of real wages, 
as in Table 2. _
We see that in the four years from 
December 1974 to December 1978 real wages 
fell about as often as they rose, with the falls,
Table 2. Percentage changes in Average
Weekly Earnings, the Consumer Price Index
and real wages, December 1974 to December
1 Q 7 ft
Percentage change in
Quarter
AWE
December 1974 5.3
March 1975 2.0
June 1975 2.8
September 1975 2.4
December 1975 5.3
March 1976 1.9
June 1976 4.9
September 1976 3.2
December 1976 1.5
March 1977 2.5
June 1977 3.1
September 1977 3.3
December 1977 0.3
March 1978 3.8
June 1978 1.2
September 1978 2.3
| December 1978 0.2
on average, being larger. In December 1974 
Average Weekly Earnings stood at $148.00. 
In the next four years prices went up 53.6 per 
cent, so to keep up, Average Weekly Earnings 
would have had to reach $227.37 in December 
1978. Instead, Average Weekly Earnings in 
December 1978 were only $221.00. Real 
wages then have fallen, on average, $6.37.
In the same period, output per worker has 
gone up 23.4 per cent, from $453.36 to $559.48 
a week. (1) This increase in productivity plus 
the cut in real wages has meant a substantial 
increase in the profit share and a reduction in 
the wage share over the period, as Table 3 
shows.
In Figure 1 these two measures of the 
attack on real wages are compared. In the 
upper part of the diagram, quarter on quarter 
changes in real wages are shown, while the 
graph shows labor’s resultant share. It is 
clear that the wage share of national income 
has been steadily falling over the period 
depicted, even in those quarters when there 
was a slight increase in real wages. Of 
course, big reductions in the level of real 
wages accelerate this process, as for example
CPI ‘Realwages’
3.7 1.6
3.6 -  1.6
3.5 - 0 . 7
0.8 1.6
5.6 - 0 . 3
3.0 — 1.1
2.5 2.4
2.2 1.0
6.0 - 4 . 5
2.3 0.2
2.4 0.7
2.0 1.3
2.3 -  2.0
1.3 2.5
2.1 - 0 . 9
1.9 0.4
2.3 - 2 . 1
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Table 3. Wages, salaries and supplements 
as a percentage of gross domestic product at 
factor cost.
Quarter L abor’ s share
June 1975 65.05
September 1975 65.09
December 1975 64.83
March 1976 63.80
June 1976 64.09
September 1976 63.15
December 1976 62.53
March 1977 62.75
June 1977 63.25
September 1977 63.17
December 1977 62.85
March 1978 62.57
June 1978 62.40
September 1978 61.30
December 1978 58.16
occurred in the December quarter of 1976, 
and again in the December quarter of last 
year.
The Historical Record
So far we have established that real wages 
have been falling for the last four years — in 
a period in which there has been, as yet, no 
sustained economic recovery. But this may 
be because wages have not fallen far enough
— or at least this is what the “real wage 
overhang” school argue. (2)
There are two ways of dealing with this 
argument. The first involves re-examining 
the evidence to see whether there has been a 
long-term trend for labor’s share of the 
national income to increase past some 
historical “natural average”. The second 
consists of assessing possible other causes 
for the dramatic fall in investment Australia 
has experienced in the recent past.
To start with the evidence, it seems at first 
sight that there has been an increase in 
labor’s share over the post-war period in 
Australia. Table 4 uses the same measure of 
the wage share as Table 3, but this time is 
based on annual, rather than quarterly, 
data.
T able 4. Wages, salaries and supplements 
as a percentage o f gross domestic product at 
factor cost, 1948/9 to 1977/78.
Y ear Wage share
48/9 55.8
49/50 53.9
50/51 50.3
51/2 61.1
52/3 57.3
53/4 56.0
54/5 57.8
55/6 58.5
56/7 57.0
57/8 58.3
58/9 56.8
59/60 57.1
60/1 57.8
61/2 58.0
62/3 56-6
63/4 55.4
64/5 56.4
65/6 58.3
66/7 57.6
67/8 58.9
68/9 58.0
69/70 58.9
70/71 61.4
71/2 60.7
72/3 59.5
73/4 60.8
74/5 65.5
75/6 64.6
76/7 63.0
77/8 62.8
However, this historical series is 
misleading for two reasons, and should be 
m odified. The first, more or less 
uncontroversial inadequacy of Table 4 is the 
fact that it overlooks significant changes in 
the class structure of Australia. While these 
changes can be overlooked in a short-run 
analysis, as we did above, if we want to look 
at a trend over a thirty year period we must 
take into account the shift that has occurred 
in Australia from self-employment to wage 
labor.
To see how such a shift can distort the 
evidence on labor’s share, consider the case 
of a shopkeeper who is forced to sell his or her 
business and gets a job, say, in the local 
supermarket. Even though, we suppose, no 
other changes occur in the economy, there 
will be an apparent increase in the wage 
share of national income and a drop in the 
profit share. This is because all the income of 
self-employed people is allocated to profits in 
the national account statistics we have been 
using.
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In the 1947 Census, self-employed people 
made up 12.5 per cent of the workforce; in 
1971 this percentage had fallen to 7.3. There 
had also been a drop in the percentage of 
employers (most of whom are, in fact, small 
employers, employing only a few workers) 
from 9.3 to 5.3 per cent of the workforce.
How can we correct our data to take this 
effect into account? One way is to adjust the 
whole series in Table 4 by selecting one 
particular distribution of the workforce into 
employers, self-employed and employees (I 
chose the 1971 Census figures) and re­
calculating labor’s share in other years.
For example, in 1954,17.9 per cent of the 
workforce were employers or self-employed, 
compared to 12.6 in 1971, a drop of 5.3 per 
cent. To calculate what would have been 
labor’s share in 1954 i f  the class structure in 
that year had been the same as it was in 1971, 
we have to adjust the wage share in 1954 by 
adding part of the income of that 5.3 per cent 
of the workforce to wages. There is room for 
argument over what fraction of the income of 
small employers and the self-employed 
should be allocated in this way. I have 
chosen to regard the wage portion of this 
income as simply equal to the ruling average 
wage, with all additional income allocated to 
profits.
This seems reasonable and is equivalent to 
assuming that our shopkeeper, having been 
forced out of business, receives the average 
wage in his or her new job.
Table 5 shows the result of re-calculating 
labor’s share for each year from 1948/9 to 
1977/8. Since census data is only available 
for 1947, 1954, 1966 and 1971, additional 
assumptions had to be made about trends in 
the structure of the workforce for other years; 
I simply assumed a constant trend between 
censuses and extrapolated the trend between 
1966 and 1971 up to the present.
The clear upward trend visible in Table 4 
has now all but disappeared, suggesting that 
it was mainly the effect of changes in the 
composition of the workforce rather than a 
consequence of a shift in income from profit 
receivers to wage earners. Of course, Table 5 
does show fluctuations in labor’s share. 
These are a consequence of class struggle 
within Australia and of external shocks to 
the Australian economy. While not wishing 
to ignore these fluctuations and the factors
T able 5, Wages, salaries and supplements 
as a percentage o f gross domestic product at 
factor cost, adjusted for changes in 
workforce composition (Ba„e: 1971), 1948/9 
to 1977/8.
Y ear W age share
48/9 60.6
49/50 58.3
50/1 54.2
51/2 65.7
52/3 61.4
53/4 59.8
54/5 61.5
55/6 62.1
56/7 60.3
57/8 61.5
58/9 59.7
59/60 59.8
60/1 60.4
61/2 60.4
62/3 58.7
63/4 57.3
64/5 58.2
65/6 59.9
66/7 59.0
67/8 60.1
68/9 58.9
39/70 59.5
70/1 61.7
71/2 60.7
72/3 59.2
73/4 60.2
74/5 64.5
75/6 63.3
76/7 61.5
77/8 61.0
which caused them, it seems that the 
evidence is that there has been no marked 
change in the underlying division of 
national income between workers and 
capitalists over the post-war period.
The Tax Man Cometh
So far, we have been examining Labor’s 
share of the national income without taking 
into account the redistributive effects of 
taxation. This is only realistic if wage 
earners and profit receivers have paid, over 
the period we are interested in, roughly the 
same proportion of their incomes in taxes 
and received roughly the same proportion 
back in benefits. However, there is a great 
deal of evidence to suggest that wage earners 
are paying a much greater share of the tax 
burden ^ind that governm ents are 
intervening more and more in the interests of 
the corporate sector.
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To quantify all these effects — even for a 
single year — is very complex and to do so 
over the whole post-war period would be well 
beyond the scope of these Notes. However, it 
is worthwhile looking at the most important 
aggregates and seeing how they have 
changed to shift resources back to profit 
receivers.
The main tax paid by wage and salary 
earners is Pay As You Earn (PAYE) income 
tax, and it is providing an increasing portion 
of government income. We should therefore 
subtract PAYE deductions in order to arrive 
at a real, after tax figure for labor’s share of 
the national income. At the same time, we 
should add back those cash benefits workers 
receive from government, such as pensions, 
unemployment benefits and the like. This 
gives a rough measure of the redistributive 
effects of government taxes and benefits,
though I should emphasise it leaves out 
many other aspects of state intervention in 
the distribution of income. It is only justified 
by the fact that the two quantities we are 
considering — net PAYE contributions of 
wage and salary earners and cash benefits to 
persons — tend to dominate the government 
income and expenditure.
Table 6 shows net PAYE payments, cash 
benefits to persons and the difference 
between the two, expressed as a percentage 
of Gross Domestic Product at factor cost. 
From 1958/59 (3) to 1964/5 benefits exceeded 
PAYE deductions but from 1965/6 the 
working class has received less back in cash 
benefits than it has paid in income tax.
If this redistributive effect is taken into 
account, as in Table 7, a picture emerges of 
the long term evolution of labor’s real share 
of national income. From the evidence there
Table 6. Net PAYE payments, cash 
benefits to persons and the difference as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product at 
factor cost, 1958/9 to 1077/8.
Table 7. Labor’s share o f national income, 
after PAYE tax and cash benefits to 
persons.
Labour’s Tax/benefit
Year N et PA Y E
Cash
benefits
D ifferen ce 
as . 
% o f  GD P
Y ear
share
(From
effect
(From
Resulting
share
($m) ($m) Table 5) Table 6)
58/9 472 687 1.936 58/9 59.7 1.936 61.6
59/60 546 741 1.579 59/60 59.8 1.579 61.4
60/1 643 820 1.348 60/1 60.4 1.348 61.8
61/2 653 900 1.823 61/2 60.4 1.823 62.2
62/3 683 937 1.743 62/3 58.7 1.743 60.4
63/4 790 1029 1.479 63/4 57.3 1.479 58.8
64/5 991 1080 0.500 64/5 58.2 0.500 58.7
65/6 1160 1156 — 0.022 65/6 59.9 — 0.022 59.9
66/7 1324 1246 — 0.366 66/7 59.0 — 0.366 58.6
67/8 1507 1294 — 0.976 67/8 60.1 — 0.976 59.1
68/9 1727 1397 — 1.346 68/9 58.9 — 1.346 57.6
69/70 2084 1590 — 1.828 69/70 59.5 — 1.828 57.7
70/1 2432 1764 — 2.246 70/1 61.7 — 2.246 59.5
71/2 2888 2048 — 2.529 71/2 60.7 — 2.529 58.2
72/3 3161 2543 — 1.640 72/3 59.2 — 1.640 57.6
73/4 4238 3076 — 2.564 73/4 60.2 — 2.564 57.6
.74/5 6071 4320 — 3.245 74/5 64.5 -  3.245 61.3
75/6 7020 6089 -  1.482 75/6 63.3 — 1.482 61.8
76/7 8529 7388 -  1.569 76/7 61.5 — 1.569 59.9
77/8 9639 8279 — 1.703 77/8 61.0 -  1.703 59.3
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seems little justification for the claim that 
the wage share has exceeded some historic 
benchmark. True, real wages in Australia 
are higher than in many other countries, but 
they have always been so.
The wage share has increased in particular 
periods, particularly in recessions when, 
typ ica lly , output fa lls  faster than 
employment. The answer in this case is to 
increase the level of economic activity, not 
cut real wages — and anyway, the wage 
share will fall, other things being equal, 
when economic recovery picks up again.
This seems to leave the “real wage 
overhang” case hanging — though no doubt 
it will still be trotted out by employers, 
government ministers, academics and 
journalists to justify why other people’s 
incomes should be cut.
1. Calculated, in December 1978 prices, from 
seasonally adjusted gross non-farm product 
per civilian employee. Gross non-farm product 
(in December 1978 prices) went up from 
$20,925.4 million in the December quarter o f 
1974 to $23,567.0 million in the December 
quarter of last year, a 12.6 per cent increase. At 
the same time, the number o f civilian 
employees in private employment fell from 
3,550,500 to 2,240,000, a drop o f 8.7 per cent. 
This means productivity increased 23.4 per 
cent.
2. See the Treasury’s R ound-up o f  E conom ic 
S ta t is t ic s : Special Supplement, “ The 
Measurement of Real Unit Labour Costs” , 
September 1978, the Australian B ulletin o f  
Labour, March 1979, or the N ational 
T im es’  P.P. McGuiness almost any week this 
year.
3. Before 1958/9 income tax receipts are not 
given separately for wage anil salary m m w s.
T. O ’S., 
7.5.79.
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The Struggle for 
Liberation in the
South Pacific
Denis Freney
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The South Pacific — an 
imperialist lake?
In terms of international politics, the 
South Pacific is one of the most isolated and 
unknown areas in the world. It has been and 
remains an imperialist lake, almost 
untouched hy the winds of the colonial 
revolution which brought Africa, Asia and 
Latin America into centre stage in world 
politics. For the imperialists it is the last 
colonial paradise: the fabulous South Seas of 
Gauguin, of Bali Hai, and coconut palms. 
More recently, it has been the scene of a new 
tourist invasion from Australia, New 
Indiana, Japan, the u s a  and even from 
western Europe. American and Australian 
millionaires still continue to sail from island 
to island in their yachts, the Japanese 
fishing fleets plunder the natural marine 
resources o f  the is lan ds, and the 
multinationals increasingly move in to 
exploit mineral and other wealth.
The islanders remain exploited, no matter 
the neo-colonial independence they have in 
large part been given. Workers receive 
minimal salaries; villagers are alienated 
from their traditional land by the colonial 
planters and by new multinational ventures; 
their former cultural values are being eroded 
by the massive tourist invasion and the take­
away culture of American imperialism; their 
politicians are corrupted by capitalist ethics 
and begin capitalist accumulation,Tby fair 
means or foul.
The island nations of the South Pacificare 
uniformly small in population: Fiji is the 
largest with 600,000; Vanuaaku (New 
Hebrides) has 100,000; New Caledonia 
150,000, while other mini-states such as 
Nauru and Nuie have populations of only a 
few thousand. The level of capitalist 
penetration in the economy varies greatly. In 
Fiji, sugar plantations cover great areas of 
the islands and are owned by multinational 
companies, particularly CSR, while tourism 
is a booming industry, again controlled by 
multinationals. In Vanuaaku, 36 per cent of 
all land is owned by Europeans, adding up to 
something like 80 per cent of arable land. In 
New Caledonia, the proportion of land 
alienated is even greater — the situation of 
the Kanaks is closer to that of the Australian 
Blacks than anything else.
Yet in the Gilbert Islands, for example, 
land alienation is minimal. Exploitation 
takes the form of grabbing the islanders for 
work on overseas shipping lines, often those 
registered in Panama or Liberia. Throughout 
the South Pacific, there is a rapidly 
increasing presence of Japanese fishing 
companies and woodchipping concerns. 
American agrobusiness is also moving in, 
while the British and French maintain 
traditional interests in copra and oil palm 
plantations. Nevertheless, it is Australian 
and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand capital 
which is dominant, though under challenge, 
in the islands. Trade is generally with 
Australia and New Zealand, providing a 
valuable outlet for their food products.
British, Australian and New Zealand 
imperialists, after the collapse of the British 
Empire in Asia and Africa, began a process 
of handing over formal independence to neo­
colonial regimes in the islands, seen as a 
preventive measure against the growth of 
nationalist political parties and to build up a 
neo-colonial, compradore elite to ensure 
political stability for the multinationals. In 
Fiji, economically the most important of the 
former British colonies, the British made 
sure that communal differences between the 
Indian and Fijian population would remain 
a fall-back for imperialism in case of a 
general radicalisation. In this, they followed 
their divide-and-rule policy applied in 
Malaysia. Generally speaking, the Anglo- 
Saxon imperialists have been successful in 
their smooth transition to a neo-colonial 
independence in the South Pacific.
Lack of nationalist political parties 
opposed to neo-colonialism has led to the 
embryonic trade unions or, in some cases, the 
co-operative movement, directing the 
discontent of workers and villagers with the 
increased exploitation they suffer from 
multinationals and their local elites. In Fiji, 
the trade union movement has been the 
major force and there have been many 
strikes. But even here the trade union 
movement has been too often the vehicle for 
political promotion for its leaders although 
they are in opposition. In Papua New 
Guinea, similarly, the trade union movement 
in Port Moresby and Lae were vehicles for 
Pangu politicians such as Maori Kiki to win 
seats. Once in power, they set about
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containing the trade union movement to 
their government’s policies.
While trade unions can and do express 
discontent and provide a class alternative, 
they cannot be the real alternative, or rather, 
the basis for building an anti-imperialist 
party unless they become truly independent, 
adopt a clear political program, and sponsor 
the formation of a real workers’ and 
villagers’ party which is not simply a vehicle 
for the political ambitions of some union 
leaders. Such a party cannot, o f course, only 
be narrowly concerned with the interests of 
union members but must also develop an 
alternative political program for the country, 
linking closely with the aspirations of the 
rural population, tackling the role o f the 
multinationals and planters, and generally 
opening up an anti-capitalist road of 
development.
Among the newly-emerging intellectuals 
in these countries, those who are radical as 
students too often lose their radicalism once 
they leave universities and win jobs in the 
bureaucracy, beginning also on the road of 
capital accumulation, by fair means or foul. 
There is often little between a job with the 
government or multinationals and surviving 
at the level o f the villager working his or her
garden. But the main difficulty is a clear-cut 
political analysis, and a lack of marxist 
consciousness among these intellectuals, 
who are generally trained in universities in 
Port Moresby, Suva, Australia or New 
Zealand, where a “ marxist culture” is 
notably lacking. Moreover, their isolation 
from Africa and Asia prevents a real study of 
the liberation movements in these countries 
which have, by and large, adopted marxism 
as the only real way forward.
The claim of “ exceptionalism” for the 
South Pacific is tailor-m ade for the 
multinationals and for imperialism in 
general. But the islands of the South Pacific 
are not paradises where the laws of historical 
d e v e lo p m e n t  do n o t  a p p ly . T h e  
multinationals are the same in Fiji or Kenya. 
Imperialism is the same in Iran or New 
Caledonia. Corrupt politicians are the same 
in Jakarta or Port Moresby. French 
legionnaires are the same in Senegal or 
Tahiti....
Imperialism is a world system of 
exploitation and on ly its means o f 
exploitation differ from place to place — from 
direct colonialism as in New Caledonia to 
military-fascism as in Jakarta or Chile, to 
neo-colonial regimes in Fiji or Kenya.
Similarly, the response to imperialism in 
the Third World is, o f necessity, uniform. The 
questions are the same: do the peoples of the 
Third World follow a neo-colonial road, with 
the local elites depending on the crumbs from 
the table of the multinationals wTiile the 
masses get only super-exploitation; or do 
they begin on a “non-capitalist road” which 
stops further multinational penetration and 
beg in s  to take over the e x is t in g  
multinationals? Do they alienate further 
land  for tou rist com p lex es  or for 
multinational agrobusinesses and mining, 
or do they take over the land already 
expropriated by planters and multinationals 
and return it to the people? Do they 
encourage massive urbanisation with 
bloated shanty towns, or concentrate on 
rural d evelopm en t, as a m eans o f  
capitalising well-considered industrial 
growth?
Of course, there are specific characteristics 
of the South Pacific nations which must be 
considered and o f course there are specific 
features of the total situation in each island-
30 AUSTKAMAN LEFT REVIKW No. 69
nation which must be considered. These 
specific features will determine the specific 
characteristics any transition to socialism in 
these countries will have; they will provide 
aids or obstacles to defeating imperialism, 
and therefore it is extremely important that 
they be studied and integrated in an overall 
strategy for socialism in these countries.
However, before looking specifically at the 
situation in Vanuaaku, as an example of 
trying to understand the process in at least 
one South Pacific nation, we need to examine 
the specific roleof French imperialism in the 
South Pacific.
French imperialism in the 
South Pacific
French im perialism , unlike British 
imperialism, has not surrendered its direct 
colonial rule in the South Pacific. On the 
contrary, it has many times expressed its 
determination that it is in the South Pacific 
as a direct colonial power “ to stay” . The 
immediate reasons are obvious: in Tahiti it 
still maintains its nuclear testing sites, while 
in New Caledonia there is a large French 
population (some 45 per cent of the total) and 
some of the richest nickel mines in the world.
French determination to stay, by outright 
use of military force if necessary, as the 
direct colonial power in the South Pacific, 
adds an explosive element to the political 
scene.
French imperialism has never gracefully 
and as a “ preventive measure” handed over 
to a neo~colonial regime, with the exception 
of its French African empire. The decision to 
give independence to its African colonies 
was dictated by specific circumstances 
following the defeat in Algeria and the 
upsurge o f  the co lo n ia l rev o lu tion  
throughout the continent. But since, 
including in the Comores islands off the 
coast o f Fast Africa, the French have given 
way only underpressure, and soughttoright 
the situation by use of force soon after.
Another feature o f French colonies is that, 
among the students from these countries 
who study in French universities, there is 
generally a strong element who absorb the 
“marxist culture” which is prevalent not 
only in the universities but also in French 
political life as a whole. O f course, these 
m arxist intellectuals are generally a 
minority and many are also absorbed into
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the n eo -co lon ia l bu rea u cra cy  a fter 
graduating. But it is a feature o f French 
imperialism’s specific difficulties which 
always makes a smooth and safe transition 
to neo-colonial rule a more difficult 
proposition than it has been for British 
imperialism.
Vanuaaku — neo-colonialism  or an 
anti-capitalist path?
Vanuaaku will be the first country in the 
South Pacific to become independent. There 
has been a real struggle, over a period of 
eight years, for independence. In other 
countries, independence has been handed 
over without a struggle (if we except some 
elements of struggle in Papua New Guinea 
before Peacock took Somare under his wing).
Vanuaaku has many specific dements in 
its socio-econom ic situation: first, a 
relatively high degree o f land alienation, but 
a small European population and the strong 
maintenance of traditional customs and 
land-ownership. Second,itis a jointcolony — 
an Angl o - French  C o n d o mi n i u m or 
“ Pandemonium” , as some wits accurately 
describe the bureaucratic chaos resulting 
from two sets o f Colonel Blimps wrangling 
over who took precedence. But this has also 
had the effect of introducing a divisive 
element among Vanuaakuans which has 
given some possibility for the colonial 
powers to apply their time-honored policy of 
divide-and-rule. On the other hand, the 
contradictions between the colonial powers 
has offered the possibility of an intelligent 
policy of “divide-and-rule” by the nationalist 
movement!
The National Party which later became 
the Vanuaaku Pati began in 1971 and set 
1977 as the deadline for independence. Very 
soon it understood that the land alienation 
by the planters and colonial companies was 
s omethi ng  l inked i ntegra l l y  with 
independence: that independence could only 
have meaning if the land was returned to the 
people. As plantations are the main 
economic stake colonialism has in the 
country (along with the big Japanese fishing 
company and the tourist industry), the 
demand for the return of the land to the 
people added a radical, anti-capitalist aspect 
to the independence struggle.
It also led to the grassroots organisation 
which is such a strong aspect of the
Vanuaaku  Pati .  The st ruggle  for 
independence and land became not only a 
generalised slogan through which voters 
could be mobilised, but a source o f 
organisation in which, increasingly, the 
demand for land and independence was 
something which was acted on in the 
villages, and the pressure on, and later 
occupation of, plantations became a key 
aspect o f the struggle.
The Vanuaaku Pati is unique in that it is 
not an electoral party. It applies, above all, a 
policy of mass struggle. It is also an 
extremely democratic party. Few parties in 
the world hold two Congresses a year (or 
even more); hold meetings o f political 
commissars from all islands and districts a 
couple of times a year. It is also closely 
governed by its membership in the villages 
and towns.
The extremely democratic organisation of 
the Vanuaaku Pati flows from a highly 
creative development o f the strong 
traditional communal customs in the 
v i l l ages  and a r ec ogni t i on  o f  the
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independence of the people, being further 
developed by the Pati. In fact, the villages 
have been in the majority “ self-ruled” by the 
people through their traditional institutions. 
The divided colonial administration has left 
the villages largely alone, particularly in 
outlying islands. Traditionally, police only 
enter villages when called upon by the chiefs 
to solve a serious problem which they cannot. 
However, the vast majority of problems and 
disputes are solved within the traditional 
structures. National independence seemed a 
logical extension of the independence of the 
villages. Thus, in thecrisis at the end of 1977, 
it was easy for the People’s Provisional 
Government to become a reality: the villages 
simply declared support and, in a sort of a 
way, their own “independence” . Thus 
“visas” or passes were needed to travel 
through Vanuaaku villages, and those 
colonial officials or their puppets who tried to 
enter villages were sent packing. The 
colonial authorities were then faced with 
having to risk an explosion by using police or 
French gendarmes to break the villages’ 
“independence” in a situation where this 
“ independence” appeared to the people only 
a logical extension of a situation which had 
largely existed in practice for many decades.
Similarly, for many years the same 
principle of the de facto “ independence” of 
the villages has radicalised the Presbyterian 
and Anglican Churches which together have 
the big majority of the population.
In the South Pacific, the churches have 
been colonial instruments of ideological 
oppression. In places like Tonga and Fiji 
they remain in that role. However, in 
Vanuaaku the two churches mentioned have 
been transformed and, in turn, have helped 
transform the political situation. The 
Presbyterian Church has a democratic 
tradition, but usually this has not meant it 
has become political, or necessarily 
identified with the earthly needs of the 
people. However, in Vanuaaku, the majority 
Presbyterian Church, through its pastors 
and lay persons from the villages, became 
“nationalised” and played a political role 
strongly supporting independence, land 
struggles, and the strengthening o f 
“custom” and the democratic traditions of 
the villages. The President of the Vanuaaku 
Pati is an Anglican priest, Walter Lini, and 
its vice-president a leading pastor in the 
P r e s b y t e r ia n  C h u r c h . B ut th e
VanuaakunPati is not a “church party” . It is 
a nationalist party in which the different 
strands of the “theology of liberation” , a 
secular nationalism, traditional “custom” 
and a radical anti-colonialism and anti­
imperialism are uniquely mixed, arising 
from the society in which itexists'and, above 
all, from the highly democratic methods 
under which the party operates.
This can be seen in the villages themselves 
where decisions are taken by the interplay of 
all these factors: the pastor, the chief, the 
Vanuaaku Pati secretary, the co-operative 
chairperson and, lately, the Youth 
Association and Vanuaaku Women 
secretaries, together with democratic 
consultation with all sectors of the 
population. Problem-solving, decisions on 
action, are made not by any one of these 
forces within the village, but by consultation 
among all of them (and in any case, the 
different “ strands” are often combined 
among them in one or more individuals). 
Thus a tremendous unity of will and action is 
built up and because there is a constant 
series of conferences, of visits from leaders 
and to headquarters in Vila, there emerges a 
nationwide unity, even down to a thorough 
understanding of tactics developed in a 
rapidly changing situation. Of course, this 
process is helped by the smallness of the total 
population as well as by traditional decision­
making processes which the Vanuaaku Pati 
has adopted and developed in an 
extraordinarily creative way. The result is an 
enormously powerful political “ machine” , 
and very creative tactics combined with 
principled strategy and goals.
This was best illustrated in the peiod of the 
People’s Provisional Government. In 
November 1977, the Vanuaaku Pati 
boycotted the elections because of the 
undemocratic electoral system and the 
powerlessness of the Assembly. As a result 
there were no elections — the many small 
puppet parties arranged it so there was only 
a single candidate for each seat and they 
were then declared elected. So the Vanuaaku 
Pati decided to form a “People’s Provisional 
Government” . This government issues visas 
or passes, and villages decided that no one 
without a pass could enter their traditional 
areas. At the same time, PPG supporters 
refused to pay taxes or vehicle licences to the 
puppet Assembly, paying them to the PPG 
instead. Villagers were given the green light
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to occupy plantations situated on their 
traditional land. The decision to set up the 
PPG was taken only after exhaustive 
discussion at a Vanuaaku Pati Congress.
I will give an example of the occupation of 
a big French-owned plantation in Malekula 
island. The plantation, with over 1,000 head 
of cattle and thousands of coconut trees, was 
on traditional land and had been claimed by 
the villagers for many years. After the PPG 
was formed, the villagers served notice on 
the manager to get out. He refused, and so a 
“guerrilla campaign” began: roads on the 
plantation were dug up or barricaded one by 
one until he could not drive out. Then some 
household pets m ysteriously died. 
Eventually, the manager decided to get out, 
so French police came in, arrested six of the 
“ringleaders” and took out the manager. But 
the arrests did not stop the action because 
there were no “ringleaders” — every step of 
the action had been decided after collective 
and exhaustive debate. When those arrested 
were jailed, the villagers served notice on the 
big French trading company, CFNH, to come 
by a certain date and remove all its property 
(worth $150,000) from its big store on the 
plantation. When the company did not meet 
the deadline, the villagers marched to the 
store and sat down outside it. A pastor said a 
prayer and then the doors were forced open. 
In a very serious atmosphere, the name of 
each head of household was called out in 
order — the first thing to be distributed was 
the rice — a bag of rice each, until it was all 
distributed. Then came the sugar, other food 
and finally several small boats. By the end of 
the day the entire property of the CFNH had 
been “ redistributed” . Another prayer, and 
then an orderly march back to their villages.
The result has been that French plantation 
and store owners have had to accept the 
reality: the only alternative would be 
massive repression and the arrest of all 
involved. The CFNH has accepted the reality
— it has asked if it could, please, still act as 
the shipping company, bringing their ships 
to buy the copra from their ex-plantation for 
sale.
Vanuaaku Pati headquarters were only 
informed after the event (following the green 
light given by the Congress for such 
occupations). The villagers saw nothing 
iron ic or amusing in this orderly 
expropriation of a big French company.
Rather it was a very serious, historic moment 
for them: it marked the return of their land, 
and the repayment, by the redistribution of
the company’s stores, for their stolen land 
and labor ove*- decades.
Today, the plantation is run under a 
system which can only be described as “self­
management” . First, the workers on the 
plantation, who mainly came from other 
islands, have been integrated and “ adopted” 
by the different villages. An elected 
committee manages the plantation. Any 
villager or ex-worker can go and prepare 
copra from the trees on the plantation. They 
then “ sell it” to the collective management 
for the price paid for it at the plantation dock 
by the trading company, less $1 a bag which 
goes into the collective’s bank account. As a 
result, workers and villagers receive more 
than double the wages they received before — 
if my memory is correct, it is, in fact, four 
times the previous amount per bag.Second, 
productivity has, not surprisingly, risen 
greatly. Concerning cattle, they are sold to 
individual villagers at a much cheaper price 
than previously, but a limit is placed on the 
number to be killed. Maintenance work on 
the plantation is done by villagers and ex­
workers and salaries are paid by the 
collective. The standard of living of all 
concerned has risen dramatically, while the 
surplus available has meant that the local 
clinic has now been taken over by the 
villagers and is paid for by them.
Arising from this experience there are 
some very important lessons for the future. 
In Papua New Guinea and other places, 
when plantations have been bought and 
handed over to local traditional owners, the 
aim of the colonial-sponsored land law hasi 
been to develop a rich peasantry, with 
individual lots, or to turn the traditional 
owners into a company — the workers 
remaining workers, with the same wages 
and conditions as before, the profit returning 
in small part only to the villagers, also being 
available for loans, etc. to allow the setting 
up of a sm all bourgeoisie. The aim of this n eo- 
colonial strategy is to satisfy the planters 
who sell at favorable rates, to give the 
semblance of ownership by traditional 
owners but, in fact, to favor the development 
of capitalism in the countryside as a social 
base for the neo-colonial regime and the 
serious exploitation of other resources by the 
multinationals.
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Vanuaaku Pati strategy is radically 
different. So far, plantations taken over have 
been run collectively. They have not been 
divided into individual holdings, which also 
has the advantage of maintaining the more 
economically viable large units. The profits 
must be won by labor if they are to go to 
individuals or familes, andthe total pro fits o f 
the plantation are invested collectively, oh 
democratically decided projects, allowing 
substantial economic development o f the 
villages concerned, and the take-over and 
self-management of formerly centralised 
functions such as clinics, etc. When 
Vanuaaku becomes independent, no doubt 
through democratic decision, there would 
have to be a tax on the self-managed 
plantations to help those villages who have 
no such enterprises on their land.
This system has not been developed 
through an “ ideological” choice of the 
Vanuaaku Pati or the villagers. I doubt if 
anyone has heard of the concept of self­
management. It developed from the very real 
traditions of the villagers themselves, of 
collective labor, of the democratic processes 
evolved by the Vanuaaku Pati, and the desire 
to maintain and develop these traditions. 
Certainly, some VP leaders know what it 
means to have capitalism consciously 
introduced into the countryside, but their 
concern only supplements the deep feeling of 
the villagers on these questions. Through a 
largely spontaneous movement, we have 
self-management existing as the mode of 
socia l relations in these occupied 
plantations. It is a fact which can provide the 
basis for a genuinely non-capitalist road in 
Vanuaaku, going towards the construction 
of a genuine democratic and socialist society, 
rooted in the deeply-held traditional customs 
of the people.
Of course, a plantation here or there is not 
the country as a whole. There are many, 
many obstacles and dangers to overcome 
and, of course, imperialism is not inactive in 
seeking a way to try to tame the Vanuaaku 
Pati and implant a neo-colonial solution on 
the country. If they fail, they will use their 
final weapon — outright military 
intervention, or use of mercenaries as 
occurred last year in the Comores. For the 
moment, however, they are seeking to tame 
the Vanuaaku Pati which has now entered 
into a “ caretaker government” with 50 per 
cent of the posts, until elections this year as a
lead up to independence.
After the experience of the People’s 
Provisional Government, the colonial 
authorities were forced to make concessions. 
They agreed to almost all the demands of the 
VP for truly democratic elections, and finally 
agreed to the “caretaker government’’ with 
the VP havifig half the posts. The period 
since last April, when the PPG was 
suspended, has seen the VP win many of the 
supporters o f the Former puppet parties, the 
increasing division among these puppet 
parties, and the clear sign that the 
overwhelming majority of the people — I 
would estimate 75 per cent—now support the 
VP or splits from other parties which back it.
The colonial powers now realise that the 
Vanuaaku Pati would win any election and 
that only three or four electorates would 
return puppets. Thus they must speed up the 
introduction of the VP into the Cabinet, give 
them responsibilities, attempt to surround 
them with colonial advisers who will show 
them the “realism” of a neo-colonial solution 
and thus try to split the VP, or tame it to a 
neo-colonial outfit, a la PANGU. The next 
two years will see heavy pressure in an 
attempt to reach such a result.
Of course, there is no certainty that the 
Vanuaaku Pati will be able to resist this 
pressure for a neo-colonial solution. The 
main guarantee is that the VP is not an 
electoral outfit, nor is it simply there as a 
means of promoting leaders to Cabinet posts. 
It is a mass party in which the masses have 
real control. It is therefore essential that the 
Vanuaaku Pati exists independently, with a 
strong leadership, separate from the 
government, even when the government 
becomes a fully Vanuaaku Pati one.
Perspectives
The separation of the party from the state 
is an extremely important one for those who 
want a democratic, self-managed socialist 
society. If the two are the same, then the way 
is open for a neo-colonial solution or a 
stalinist-type dictatorship.
Concretely, in Vanuaaku, the danger is 
that, after winning power and then 
independence, the Vanuaaku Pati will 
become simp ly a support for the government, 
that the real decisions will be taken in the 
Cabinet with the public service bureaucracy,
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and that the democratic decision-making 
structure of the Pati, developed over the past 
eight years, will be forgotten. This would 
make it very easy for a neo-colonial solution 
to develop, particularly if all the main 
leaders of the Pati were to become ministers, 
and the Pati leadership second rank figures, 
carrying out orders from the government, 
with the Pati mobilised only at election time.
Dangers also remain strong if, for the 
period after independence, all legislative 
power rests with the National Assembly, 
elected only every few years, and with full­
time parliamentarians drawing big salaries 
and leading a comfortable life in Vila where 
they would be tempted to begin capital 
accumulation and, inevitably, fall into the 
trap of corruption.
Rather, the logical extension of the 
democratic decision-making of the VP is to 
transform the legislative bodies into true 
organs of popular democracy. That does not 
mean the “popular democracy” which 
elsewhere assumes that name, but a pattern 
based on the regular VP congresses and 
Political Commissars’ meetings where 
decisions are made by regular meetings of 
representatives from the villages; after 
thorough pre-discussion; with post-Congress 
discussion; with thoroughly democratic 
debate carried out in a way accessible to the 
delegates and, above all, with the right to 
change delegates from one meeting to 
another should a delegate not vote in a way 
suitable to the opinions of the village(s) 
represented. Vanuaaku is fortunate in 
having a small population in which such a 
form of direct democracy can be applied. 
Similarly, village, district and island 
government could and should follow the 
same pattern. The bad example of 
“Provincial Government” in Papua New 
Guinea and elsewhere “decentralisation” 
has meant the establishment of many mini­
parliaments, complete with their quotas of 
paid parliamentarians, bureaucracies and 
corruption should be avoided.
The policy of direct democracy is also 
economic, as it implies that, at best, 
delegates should only receive travelling 
expenses and any other out-of-pocket costs 
incurred in their cuties — no high salaries, 
no privileges, no attendant bureaucrats and 
no corruption. To maintain the institutions 
of western parliamentary democracy in such
a small country is to automatically favor the 
development of an elite whose aim in life 
becomes capital accumulation and the Good 
Life in the Bright Lights. In countries such 
as Vanuaaku, the state and parliamentary 
forms become the prime means of developing 
a local capitalist class. There are many, 
many examples of that.
Of course, the system of direct democracy 
for legislative decisions has problems, 
particularly if laws are drafted in 
incomprehensible legal terminology. But 
this can be overcome. Such direct democracy 
does not exclude the need for the Vanuaaku 
Pati continuing to operate in a parallel 
pattern. Village or district representatives to 
the legislative congresses will also come 
from non-Vanuaaku Pati areas and to isolate 
colonial manoeuvres it is important not to 
impose bans on other parties unless they 
physically take up arms against the 
democratically elected government. Such 
bans against opposition parties, even those 
which back the planters, would negate the 
grassroots democracy that the Vanuaaku 
Pati has practised in the past. Therefore, the 
Vanuaaku Pati must act as a Pati, continue 
its democratic decision-making and be in a 
position where it can debate broader issues of 
strategy and long-term goals outside the 
narrower confines of passing laws.
So, immediately, we see a danger in the 
contradiction between the direct democracy 
in the V an u aak u  P a ti, and the 
parliamentary forms they will have to live 
with at least until some time after 
independence.
But there are others which will determine 
whether Vanuaaku follows a neo-colonial 
path. Foremost is the attitude to proposals by 
multinationals for new developments in the 
fields of tourism, fishing, wood-chipping and 
so on, and of guarantees which the colonial 
powers will undoubtedly seek for the future, 
of multinational or overseas investment at 
present in the country.
In the transition ̂ period to independence, 
we can expect multinationals to try to stake 
their claims as soon as possible, while the 
colonial powers are able to exercise the 
maximum pressure. How the VP responds 
will be an important pointer. Similarly, the 
question of plantations claimed by villagers 
will also be a question for negotiation: for 
example, the way in which planters will be
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compensated — by the colonial governments 
or by the Vanuaaku government? Also 
relevant is the speed with which the hand­
over — or take-over — of the plantations will 
proceed. The colonial authorities will seek to 
have decisions made on these questions 
before independence, whereas it is realistic to 
say that such decisions can only justly be 
taken by an in dependent nation, notone still 
under colonial tutelage. However, it cannot 
be excluded that compromises of one sort or 
another may be made to ease the way to 
independence. The scope and nature of such 
compromises will, however, be crucial, as 
will the way in which they are decided upon.
O f longer term, certain ly  after 
independence, is the question of the future of 
major multinational and big business 
investment in the country: the plantations as 
a whole, of course, but also the big Japanese 
fishing company, the tourist hotels, the 
small BHP manganese mines, the BP and 
French trading companies and so on.
Of course, these are difficult political and 
economic questions, and possibly different 
approaches will be taken to them at different 
speeds and with different solutions. The 
plantations are, of course, the burning 
question.
For the future, the real question is how can 
an independent Vanuaaku develop 
econom ically  w ithout becom ing a 
playground for the multinationals, without 
the destruction of its culture, without a 
massive influx into the towns and without 
the expropriation of much of the nation’s 
wealth by a new elite emerging from those in 
power after independence?
Problems of development
The first question is: what kind of 
development? For example, there is currently 
a proposal for a large casino in Vila. There is 
a proposal by a Japanese company to begin 
woodchipping on Malekula. There are 
proposals for a rash of new hotels to 
accommodate a major tourist boom. This is 
the “development”  being proposed by the 
multinationals who argue that it will provide 
jobs for Vanuaakuans. No doubt there will be 
a few jobs — as servants in the tourist 
expansion and casinos, and as laborers in 
the woodchipping industry. No doubt also 
there will be some foreign exchange won. But
at what cost?
In large countries, with strong political 
systems and a stable society already 
industrialised (I think here of Yugoslavia or 
Romania, for example( a massive tourist 
industry can be absorbed without destroying 
the culture and, generally, can be a 
reasonable economic development. However, 
in small countries struggling to overcome the 
legacy of colonialism and the threat of neo­
colonialism, to strongly establish their own 
culture and stable independent political life, 
massive tourism can be a disaster — as can 
be seen in Fiji. So far, in Vanuaaku, with two 
large international hotels and a dozen 
smaller ones, tourism has been contained 
and does not yet pose a critical problem. But 
the last thing one would wish on 
Vanuaakuans is that they become a nation 
of servants, pandering to the whims of 
Australian and Japanese tourists. Moreover, 
the nature of tourism in countries such as 
Vanuaaku is that it is controlled by 
multinationals, the costs are paid in the 
home countries, even much of the food is 
imported directly, and very little really 
remains in the country, A massive new 
tourist explosion would have very bad 
consequences for Vanuaaku.
Similarly, wood-chipping would destroy the 
heritage of the people — the inland forests in 
which their forefathers lived, a natural 
wealth in its own right that no one has the 
right to destroy now for the goal of a bit more 
foreign exchange and a few jobs.
There is no mad rush to endorse, or embark 
on, schemes proposed by the multinationals 
and others. That applies to “development” in 
general. The same democratic procedures 
that apply within the Vanuaaku Pati should 
also apply to all development — it is 
necessary to clearly fix priorities, to discuss 
all sides (and not only the “ advice” of the 
colonial “experts” or those brought out by 
the multinationals). In general, it is 
necessary to develop a plan for development, 
stretching over a long period, aimed at co­
ordinated and clear-cut goals.
How can such a plan be developed? 
Traditionally, under neo-colonialism when 
such plans are even considered, they are 
drawn up by “expert” bureaucrats at the top 
and then announced with a flourish to the 
people. There is another alternative:
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planning should begin from the villages and 
then proceed up, for consolidation and 
elaboration, to be then transmitted to the 
base again.
That could mean, for example, that 
villages, singly, or in groups, draw up 
“Cahiers” or lists of projects and needs for 
their villages which they would like included 
within a national plan. Before and during 
such discussions on village plans, a 
nationwide discussion should begin on 
priorities, goals and different major national 
projects. The villages could also be 
encouraged to try to find their own resources
— financial, material and human — the 
solutions and the means to build their own 
projects, limiting the need to call in central 
government finances and aid. At the same 
time, they should have available technical 
advice from the centre to help them plan.
Thus, village by village, island by island, a 
clear picture of the hopes, needs and 
priorities of the people will be built up, where 
they will decide what they want to do for 
‘ ‘development” in their areas in the following 
five or so years. Of course, new ideas will 
come when they examine the draft plans of 
other villages and islands — an intensive 
interchange of ideas can take place, leading 
to modifications and changes.
These plans would not. of course, only 
cover strictly econoir’f* proiects but also 
health, education, culture and so on. 
Discussion would then have to take place on 
a national level, considering particularly the 
requests from different villages and islands 
for central government aid in fulfilling their 
own plans, as well as major national 
projects, priorities and funding.
One major advantage of such planning is 
that everyone down to the simplest villager is 
drawn into the planning process and has an 
awareness and commitment to carrying out 
the plan. Moreover, the stress should be on 
the villagers doing as much as possible with 
their own resources, and not relying 
passively on centralised funding. This in 
turn encourages collective saving and use of 
capital, rather than its diversion into 
individual capitalist enterprises. It will help 
end the divorce between the central 
government and the villagers. And it is 
something that fits perfectly with the 
traditional pattern of village life and 
decision-making.
“Development” and “ planning” have been 
mystified by the “ experts” , and by 
colonialism, into things divorced from 
ordinary mortals, whose allotted task is to 
pay for them and carry them out, but not to 
understand them. In fact, it is mystification 
for the explicit purpose of allowing the 
multinationals and colonial “experts” to 
make the decisions for their own profit. When 
there is a process of democratic planning, 
from the villages up, the mystification 
disappears.
It is within such a finally democratically 
decided national plan that a role for foreign 
aid and investment can be worked out and, 
as we said before, there is no rush to agree to 
their plans.
Guidance and technical advice will be 
needed, of course, at all levels of the 
democratic planning process. For example, 
there would be danger of village plans being 
essentially for social welfare projects — it 
must be pointed out that it is necessary to 
also expand economic production, to in part 
fund these projects. It then requires technical 
advice on suitable crops, the situation in 
international markets and so on. This would 
also apply even more on major national 
projects.
I hope this outlines conceptions I have of 
how it will be possible for Vanuaaku to 
develop: by the very nature of such planning, 
the emphasis would be overwhelmingly on 
the development of the rural areas where the 
vast majority of the people live. In any case, I 
believe this is the only real basis for 
development and eventual industrialisation. 
Vanuaaku’s wealth is its rich soil and 
natural resources and, above all, its people. It 
is upon these natural and human resources 
and not upon foreign aid and investment 
that the national essentially will develop. 
Any outside aid can only have a role if 
carefully slotted into the mobilisation of the 
people.
Finally, I want to highlight the very real 
threat that imperialism, and particularly 
French imperialism, will use military force to 
try to stop any such non-capitalist road of 
development. But it is the mobilisation of the 
people that is the main guarantee that such 
force wil^fail. Already the Vanuaaku Pati 
has supported the formation of self-defence 
units in the villages.
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New Caledonia — Armed Struggle?
In New Caledonia the struggle is much 
more difficult. Not only are the French 
imperialists unwilling to leave this nickel- 
rich colony, but they have also introduced a 
relatively large settler population.
It is ironic that among the first French 
colons there were convicts deported after the 
Paris Commune. Unfortunately, they and 
their descendants quickly became as racist 
as any settlers in South Africa or Australia. 
The Kanak people were robbed of their land 
and the colons settled the west coast 
particularly, turning it into a little bit of 
France, so well advertised on tourist 
brochures today. Of course, included in the 
50,000-odd French nationals in New 
Caledonia today is a good percentage of 
expatriate civil servants, teachers and — 
military. They nevertheless have full voting 
rights in the powerless Territorial Assembly.
This heavy colonisation has resulted in a 
much greater loss of culture among the 
Kanaks than has taken place in Vanuaaku. 
Deculturisation among the Kanaks has led 
to many of the problems, particularly in the 
urban areas, which exist among Australian 
Blacks. Moreover, there has arisen an Uncle 
Tom “reformist” elite who politically, and in 
other ways, mislead the Kanaks into 
accepting the colonial situation. The French 
administration and the big nickel company 
follow a policy of “carrot and stick” to hinder 
the rise of the newly-emerging Kanak 
independence movement.
Nevertheless, the Kanak independence 
movements of PALIKA and FULK have 
made steady progress, particularly in the 
Kanak reserves of the East Coast of the 
“ Grand Terre”  (main island) and in 
particular in the Loyalty Islands where land 
alienation is minimal. The PALIKA is also 
having an increasing impact among the 
dispossessed Kanak youth in Noumea and 
other urban centres. The beginnings of a 
grassroots based movement, centred in the 
reserves, is also emerging, although 
unfortunately there is still a long way to go to 
match the grassroots strength and 
organisation of the Vanuaaku Pati.
There can be no doubt that the struggle for 
independence in New Caledonia is going to 
be the most difficult in the South Pacific. The
Kanaks can therefore rightly ask, and 
expect, the total solidarity of the independent 
nations of the region. In one sense, New 
Caledonia is the South Africa of the South 
Pacific — and it is correct to demand that all 
governments — even the most servilely neo­
colonial ones in the region — unite to support 
the Kanaks and kick the French imperialists 
out of their country.
Largely through the initiative of the 
Vanuaaku Pati, a Kanak leader spoke at the 
United Nations and made an extended visit 
through A frica , w inning the first 
in ternational support for Kanak 
independence. Of course, the first priority 
must be to win bigger Kanak support for 
independence, but that can also be greatly 
helped if there is a mobilisation of the 
already independent nations of the South 
Pacific for their support. Papua New Guinea 
and Fiji have recently made strong 
s t a te me nt s  f or  New C a l e d o n i a n  
independence, while the Vanuaaku Pati has 
assured the Kanaks that it will never desert 
their just struggle no matter how much 
pressure they face from France. The VP has, 
in a very principled way, said that Vanuaaku 
can never be truly independent until New 
Caledonia is also truly independent. That is 
a very real statement as New Caledonia will 
be the launching pad for any imperialist 
intervention in Vanuaaku.
As for armed struggle, it is very difficult to 
see how this could be successfully launched, 
given the small population, the small land 
area and the strength of the French military 
presence. But it cannot, of course, be 
excluded, at a later stage.
The intransigence of French imperialism 
in the South Pacific adds an explosive 
element to the total situation. It could be the 
basis for the radicalisation of the present 
South Pacific institutions which are still 
dominated by the old colonial powers 
(including Australia and New Zealand) and 
lead to the formation of a new organisation 
on the style of the Organisation of African 
Unity, with a very special focus on forcing 
French imperialism out of New Caledonia 
and Tahiti, and excluding the French, 
British, American, Australian and New 
Zealand governments. Indeed the formation 
of such an organisation is a very necessary 
step towards the collective and individual 
independence of the South Pacific nations.
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The present institutions are dominated by 
imperialist powers, despite some straining 
for a bigger role by PNG and Fiji, and also 
Western Samoa.
From this arises another question: is it 
viable to have so many mini-states, each 
existing alone,rather than try to build a 
South Pacific Federation in which each state 
would maintain its independence, but in 
which unity could be gradually built, first 
from a common political struggle to rid the 
Pacific of direct colonialism, then to fight for 
economic co-operation, co-ordinate pressure 
and demands on the dominant neo-colonial 
powers, and so on?
An OAU-style organisation, pledged to 
fight colonialism in the region, and to build 
unity, would enable the South Pacific 
nations as a whole to take a much more 
active role in world affairs, to seek genuine 
independence at least at a diplomatic level,
and to seek to establish links with the 
African nations in particular, whose 
struggles and situation have some important 
similarities (for example, the OAU struggle 
against racism in southern Africa has its 
parallels with the struggle against French 
colonialism in New Caledonia and Tahiti).
Such an OAU-style organisation is not the 
end-all of the struggle. Imperialism and neo­
colonialism remain and will remain 
implanted, as they are in the majority of the 
African members of the OAU. The anti­
imperialist and anti-capitalist forces will 
also have to seek their own form of unity in 
the region.
But an OAU-style organisation would also 
provide protection for nations such as 
Vanuaaku which will undoubtedly be in the 
vanguard of the struggle against French 
imperialism in the South Pacific. That is not 
a minor consideration.
Film Review — Continued from 
page 49.
official forces the reluctant and bewildered bailiff 
to take the more-or-less unresisting doctor to an 
unstaffed jail and court. No one, except the bailiff, 
finds these proceedings peculiar. After the doctor 
is taken away, Harker orders that the room where 
the Count wai killed and Lucy’s body lies, be 
closed up, never to be opened. For the first time 
since his return from the Carpathians, he smiles; 
we see his fangs; the Count is dead, long live the 
Count! In the final scene, Harker whips his horse 
across the shoreline where he previously walked 
with his loving wife, galloping into the middle 
distance, the vampire abroad again.
Herzog’s ^political message would appear to be 
that sacrifices to stave off external threats are 
useless. The threat does not come from outside, but 
is nurtured and nursed within our domestic walls.
The bureaucracy, relying on authoritarianism and 
bluff, is content to incarcerate the righteous 
avengers (shades of Baader-Meinhof?) and to 
ignore the desperate and despairing nature of 
social reality. In circumstances of bourgeois 
complacency, and in the absence of any sense of 
community or of the danger about to overtake 
society, is it any wonder that the menace, aided by 
a foolish, officious bureaucracy, can re-establish 
itself?
Herzong’s political vision is bleak. His film, 
opening with mummified cadavers silently 
screaming their pain and closing with the new 
Dracula lossing himself anew upon the world is 
more manifestly horrific than any horror movie.
~ — Kathe Boehringer.
TWO TRIBUTES.....
D ick  M akinson who died in January, and H elen Palm er who died in May, both in their 
different ways contributed to the intellectual and cultural life of Australia and of the Australian 
socialist movement. Dick was a Communist Party member from the ’30s until his death, while 
Helen was a member for nearly 20 years until her expulsion in 1956 for seeking open discussion 
of the crimes of the Stalin period. We publish, as tributes, orations at their funerals by Peter 
Mason and Jack Blake.
HELEN PALMER
We have come here to say our last farewell to our 
dear colleague and friend, Helen Palmer and to 
convey a sad farewell from her dear sister, Aileen.
The parents of Helen and Aileen, Vance and 
Nettie Palmer were great civilising influences in 
the Australian society o f their day. So also in her 
own chosen fields of life activity, Helen Palmer 
had a civilising influence on people with whom she 
came in contact.
As a writer, Helen is known for her work in 
Australian history, in education, and in a wide 
variety o f political and social subjects.
Not very long ago she was deeply moved when 
shown a poem by her father which was found in 
the pocket o f a young worker after his death. The 
poem had been laboriously copied out in pencil on 
a sheet taken from an exercise book; its last line 
ran:
But these are my people and I ’m with them till 
*h,e end.
But in ner own way Helen continued this 
democratic Australian tradition throughout her 
life. A  famous last line o f her own conveys this 
most strikingly:
When they gaol a man for striking 
it’s a rich man’s country yet.
Helen was not a shadow of her parents. She 
chose her own fields o f endeavour and in all those 
fields the mark of her character and personality 
can be found.
As educationist and teacner she was devotea to 
Fort Street school with which she had a long­
standing association. Her teacher colleagues 
became her friends. She had a warm capacity for 
friendship and an intuitive sense o f the problems 
and needs of her students, especially so in cases of 
the under-privileged.
From her early years and during all her life, 
Helen was a socialist who engaged herself actively 
in all the causes she felt to be connected with her 
central socialist beliefs—the anti-fascist and anti­
war movements o f the thirties, the democratic 
movement in support o f Republican Spain.
In the second world war Helen served in the 
airforce. After the war she continued her activities 
in democratic, civil liberties, peace and similar 
movements in the difficult years of the cold war. I
remember some twenty-seven years ago, a difficult 
journey she made to China; in spite of all the 
efforts powerful political and military authorities 
made to prevent her, Helen reached Peking on her 
mission of peace. She was a person of much moral 
and physical courage.
At the turning point of 1956 when the malign 
influence that had been at work in the heart of 
world socialism was revealed, Helen Palmer was 
one of the most vigorous and steadfast exponents 
o f the need for full, open, democratic discussion of 
the causes and nature o f the sickness which had 
seriously damaged the socialist movement. She 
was convinced that this was the only way to 
eliminate the sickness and prepare the ground for 
creative renewal in a cause she held so dear.
She suffered because of these efforts, but 
undaunted, she set about the work of founding the 
journal O utlook which carried the subtitle An 
Independent Socialist Journal and declared itself 
to be a forum for fact, thought and opinion in the 
cause of socialism in Australia.
O utlook was launched in the middle of 1957 and 
continued publication for 13 years until December 
1970. During that time, Helen Palmer was the 
editor who brought together an editorial board o f 
distinguished people of varying viewpoints, but 
devoted to the cause o f the journal. Contributors 
and supporters formed a very much wider circle.
As the late Ian Turner expressed it in the final 
number of O utlook:
What did it achieve? First... O utlook 
provided a refuge, a place for many of us to 
examine, and to lick, our wounds of 1956, to 
regain our intellectual and emotional health 
and vigour, to come back fighting. Without 
O utlook, inspired as it was by Helen Palmer’s 
humanity, tolerance and equanimity, wecould 
not have done that....
Secondly, we formulated and propagated 
significant socialist policies on many of the 
major problems confronting Australian 
society.... It is clear now that many of our 
initiatives have borne fruit.
Apart from the work on Viet Nam done through 
Outlook, Helen Palmer was personally at the 
centre o f the great popular Australian movement 
against the war in Viet Nam. She was active in all 
the public manifestation s of that movement, but it 
was in the councils, conferences, and committees 
which gave guidance and inspiration to the whole 
movement where Helen gave her greatest service.
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Those guiding bodies brought together diverse 
groups whose conflicts with each other at times 
threatened to break up the movement. Helen 
Palmer played a major part in preventing this, not 
by smooth conciliation, but in her crisp and 
businesslike style she would press the sources of 
conflict to the fringe and focus the attention o f all 
on the common purpose. She was known to have 
no sectional axe to grind.
It was in that field that I came to know still 
better than I had before Helen's talent for 
discerning and nurturing the good in people. I 
know her to have passionately defended against 
attack persons who had treated her badly, or 
whose views on many matters she disliked, but 
whom she knew to be making a positive 
contribution to some part o f the common cause.
Her friends know that with all the seriousness o f 
her life, Helen had a keen sense of humour, she h ad 
a sharp response to the absurd or the ridiculous — 
a spontaneous, lively chuckle accompanied by 
that characteristic nasal snort. This response was 
just as spontaneous and marked when she told a 
story against herself.
Division of people into angels or devils was not 
Helen’s way; she had the more human approach 
that rach af us. at diffwent times in our lives, or 
sometimes at one and the same, are part angel — 
part devil.
She a v o id ed  c la s s ify in g  peop le  in to  
unchangeable categories, and for that reason she 
succeeded in bringing together people who 
otherwise may have found themselves in conflict
And so, in grieving at this, our last farewell to 
Helen, we at the same time celebrate her life. I 
think I express the thought of us all when I say it is 
that life, that unwavering line of work done in 
public duty, that particular person and friend, 
Helen Palmer, we will always remember.
— Jack Blake, 
May 10,1979.
D I C K  M A K I N S O N  -  S C I E N T I F I C  
W ORKER
Dick asked me to say a few things about him 
today. The only instruction I have is that there 
must be no religious mumbo-jumbo. That’s just 
what those Greek philosophers said when they 
started science and, indeed, our whole Western 
way of thinking over 2,000 years ago.
Dick was a true natural philosopher — a 
physicist’s physicist. He said he always wanted to 
know what makes things tick. So I'll talk about
Dick the scientific worker; I’ll also say something 
about him as a person, and I’ll even tell you a few o f 
the jokes he was making just last week.
D ick  w as one o f  the few  A u stra lia n  
Corresponding Members o f the World Federation 
o f Scientific Workers.
The primary aim of that Federation is:
the increase o f human welfare through the 
application and development o f science.
That aim is also the key to the scientific, career 
and life-of Dick Makinson: the increase of human 
welfare through the application and development 
of science; and he really lived up to it. He became 
an outstanding teacher — not only in hiB lectures, 
but also in tutorials, in the lab, and in his 
availability for helping students with problems 
whether scientific or not.
His research was generally directed to practical 
ends. When he started his well-known work on 
calculators for the blind I had the job o f asking him 
what research he wasf planning for the coming 
year, and how much money he would need for it. 
No, he said, he wasn’t doing any ‘real’ research, 
j ust m aking a few electronic gadgets that might be 
useful. A little money would help, but save the 
funds for the young staff members who were 
starting on their research careers and really 
needed it.
Later it turned out that he had been buying some 
items and subsidizing his calculator project out of 
his own pocket.
Dick got o ff to a brilliant scientific start, 
winning the University o f Sydney medal for 
physics and going on to study the physics of 
metals with A. H. Wilson at Cambridge. His 
research on the thermal conductivity of metals 
was published in the Proceedings o f  the 
Cambridge Philosophical Society, and it finds its 
place in Wilson’s classical book- The Theory o f  
Metals. A metal is a highly crystalline material, 
and Dick was just as interested in the opposite sort 
of material with no regular structure at all — viz. a 
glass.
Just last year he was thrilled to obtain a long, 
shiny ribbon of a new and unexpected material — 
a metallic glass, whose properties he intended to 
study.
He was lucky to be at Cambridge in a sort of 
Golden Age. There was a ferment of new ideas; 
science was again seen as a part o f society but now 
in a dynamic society faced with the threat of 
fascism. Fascist technology had helped Franco to 
win the Spanish Civil War and science would 
clearly be increasingly important both in war and 
peace. It had political as well as purely intellectual 
dimensions.
As an unusually sensitive schoolboy, Dick had 
already developed a strong awareness of social
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injustice. His scientific attitude brought him into 
contact with the radical scientists o f  Cambridge. 
He gravitated naturally into marxism and 
brought his combination o f ideas back with him 
when he and Rachel came to Sydney, just prior to 
the war.
Dick’s satisfaction when it came to working on 
calculators for the blind wasn’t simply the joy in 
designing an instrument and getting it to work 
(which he did extremely well, with the particular 
help of Ingram Paterson), but the whole socia l 
function  o f the project— choosing and buying the 
components; working w ith  the blind students as if 
he was their brother (he had a strong, near 
religious, faith — allied to his marxism — in the 
brotherhood o f man, or o f humanity); being 
completely available to the students; and beyond 
that, on the more tedious administrative side, 
working with The Royal Blind Society, sitting on 
cpmmittees, g iving advice, and quietly, 
unobtrusively, getting on with the job of helping 
wherever he had abilities that were needed.
His personal qualities were direct, forthright, 
and in tune with that austere scientific world-view 
o f his.
As so often with people who have a wide vision 
and a lot of dedication, it is those who are nearest 
to them, who love them, who have to pay much o f 
the price. He’s even been rough on me, as I’ll tell 
you in a moment or two.
This uncomprising commitment to truth can be 
just too rational, too harsh, for normal human 
living.
But it still can require personal courage. I 
remember him, soon after he came to Macquarie, 
going out to a big and noisy Viet Nam meeting on 
the front lawn. When there came a turn at the 
microphone, he walked up and said “ I don’t 
suppose many of you have actually seen a 
communist before....” and proceeded to explain his 
position calmly and rationally, holding the whole 
audience silent.
Let me give you a glimpse of his character — his 
guts, his forthrightness and his dry humour — by 
telling you of a few things that have happened 
within this last week.
There has been a long-standing battle between 
Dick and me on the question o f blackboards.
We both preferred them to the new-fangled 
alternatives, but Dick believed it imperative that 
they be cleaned by attendants between lectures, 
whilst I thought it no great sweatif we had to clean 
them ourselves. He became very cross with what 
seemed to him my sloppy attitude.
Last week, when he was being cared for at 
Neringbah Hospital, more gently and beautifully 
that I would have thought possible, a chance 
reference was made to blackboards. Dick waved
for a pen and paper, and scrawled (in his normal 
handwriting):
Chalk and blackboards are the writing 
instruments that come naturally
and then, in brackets —
(the hospital attendant cleans them).
The joke was certainly on me. On the same piece of 
paper he had already shown his tremendous spirit 
by suddenly sitting up and writing:
A pity there isn’t an organisation to give Wakes to 
order.
It was an electrifying moment. We all assumed, of 
course, that this was what he was wanting. “ Do 
you w ant a Wake?” , Rachel asked him. Grabbing 
the paper he wrote a big, bold NO! Dick never left 
you in any doubt about his attitude.
On Friday night, last Friday night, WIBS Smith 
and I were sitting by Dick’s bedside and we started 
talking about negative ions in the atmosphere; 
how they could be generated and what 
physiological effects they could have in making 
you feel brighter. Dick showed great interest and 
urged us to go on, even though he could only join in 
intermittently. His mind was crystal clear, he 
loved the discussion and he had no pain. He really 
enjoyed it. He even took some tea, a great love of 
his, and inseparable in his view from any good 
seminar. No tea and biscuits — not much of a 
seminar, he used to say.
Dick really was a scientist in the old Greek 
mould. He sought to interpret the world around 
him; but he also sought to change it.
With a chap like Dick, you don’t easily talk to 
him of affection, o f love, and many of us perhaps 
have wondered if he realized the deep affection in 
which he was held. We can be happy that someone 
had the thought to send him a letter — which he 
got towards the end o f last week, and read twice 
with pleasure — telling him just how much and 
how widely he was loved.
He had a little trick, maybe his own invention, 
related to the importance he attached to tea and 
biscuits. I’ll tell you about it, because it shows his 
gentleness, his humour and his brotherliness.
It was a large glass jar which he placed on the 
table in the tea-room. It was full o f biscuits and the 
label, in his scrawly writing, said M agic 
Pudding.
It would, he said, never be empty. But, as a hint, 
the label also said
Work a little Magic yourself, sometimes.
Dick Makinson was a man who worked quite a 
lot of magic for quite a lot o f people.
Peter M ason, 
January 17, 1979.
discussion
John Sendy’s book Comrades Come Rally has 
created considerable interest in the Labor 
Movement in Melbourne. In general, it has made a 
contribution not only to the history o f the 
Communist Party o f Australia, but also to 
enhancing the reputation of the CPA in the minds 
of many members o f the ALP. That, at any rate, 
has been my experience.
But I would like to comment on some o f the 
matters raised by Eric Aarons in his review in 
ALR No. 66. In particular, I wish to contribute a 
point of view on the split which led to the 
formation of the SPA.
Was this split inevitable? My view, for what it is 
worth, is that some people in the CPA would not 
have been able to accept the growing independent 
and critical attitudes towards the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union and would have left the 
Party. But it seems to me that this is not the main 
point.
The thing which concerns me (and John Sendy 
too, I think) was that a split was regarded as 
desirable by the majority on leading CPA bodies 
at the time.
Thus Eric Aarons, in my opinion, misses the 
point when he concedes “excesses” . An excess is a 
departure from a main orientation. In the case of 
the split with the SPA, it was the orientation 
towards a split that was wrong.
It was believed that those holding an 
“ opposition” viewpoint constituted a dead weight 
or worse on the Party, and that the sooner they got 
out and formed their own outfit the better.
I believe that these attitudes were mistaken for 
the following main reasons:
1. They took little or no account that people’s 
attitudes can change — perhaps not 180 degrees, 
but to some extent. After all, nearly all members of 
the Party holding the majority viewpoint had 
changed their view on the USSR and pretty 
rapidly at that. Our Party was relatively late in 
responding to the 1956 events and many changes 
came with a rush.
I recall the issue o f Tribune in November 1967 
when Lloyd Churchward wrote an article critical 
o f Soviet democracy. Most leading members of the 
Party were at least a little outraged. In fact, Laurie 
Carmichael — in Moscow at the time — was the 
joint author along with Pat Clancy o f a stiff reply 
to Churchward. But, to his great credit, Laurie 
C arm ich ael ch a n ged  h is  v iew . Was it 
unreasonable to expect others to do the same, 
especially after the dust settled a little on 1968?
2. That while some people may not change
their view of the USSR very much (if at all), they 
may still retain a belief in a united party, able to 
act coherently in Australian conditions. Such 
people would see how disastrous a split could be in 
reducing the effectiveness and standing o f the 
Party to which they had devoted a large part of 
their lives.
There are a number of such people who play a 
creditable part in the C PA today. There could have 
been more.
I attended several recent CPA branch meetings 
at the time o f the trials of “dissidents ” in the USSR 
and met a few people in this category. There were 
some sharp political exchanges on the above issue, 
but they did not dominate the meetings. All those 
who had a contrary view to mine were to one extent 
or another engaged in Party work.
If indeed a split was inevitable in the early 
1970s, then the question was: Would there emerge 
another Party with the numbers and the cadre 
force with ability and mass connections to be an 
effective political force to rival and harrass the 
CPA and be an effective funnel for overseas 
influence? The CPA’s desire for a split ensured a 
positive answer to this question. We became the 
assistant recruiting agents for the SPA.
But worse was to come after the split with the 
SPA, that is, the prospect o f a split between those 
with the “ good riddance” attitude and those who 
opposed it. Some of the exponents of “ good 
riddance” seemed quite calm and fatalistic about 
such a prospect.
3. A split develops a momentum of its own,
accentuating attitudes rather than moderating 
them. Both sides of the split feel the need to justify 
themselves. The person with some doubts about 
Soviet policy but with reservations about the CPA 
tends to become under the conditions of a split a 
last-ditch defender o f the indefensible aspects of 
the USSR.
As John Halfpenny has pointed out, many 
members o f the SPA privately express criticisms of 
the USSR but take a different attitude in public.
In a different way, the CPA has not succeeded 
yet in coming to terms with the Soviet reality or in 
developing the ongoing debate necessary for such 
a process.
Both these phenomena are to be explained 
largely by the split and the bad atmosphere.
Apart from that, the sag in morale following a 
split (which we all under-estimated, in my opinion) 
caused many people on both sides to drop out of 
political life.
In any case, I believe John Sendy’s book and 
Eric Aaron’s review will stimulate further 
consideration o f this period o f CPA history.
D. Davies, 
(Newport, Vic.)
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SEEDS FOR CHANGE: Creatively 
co n fro n tin g  the en erg y  future by
Deborah White, Philip Sutton, Alan Pears, 
Chris Mardon, John Dick and Maurie Crow, 
Patchwork Press/Conservation Council of 
Victoria, 540 pp. Review by Hugh Saddler.
M ost w ritin g  on en ergy  p o licy  can , 
unfortunately, be allocated to one of two 
categories. On the one hand are the smug “ leave it 
to us, the experts” pronouncements o f spokesmen 
(never women) o f the oil, coal, gas and electricity 
industries and associates in the public service and 
academia. We all know why this stuff is no good.
Much of the remaining writing, while sharply 
critical of these establishment views, falls into the 
trap  o f  w hat m igh t be term ed energy 
fundamentalism. The arrangements society 
makes about energy are important, because 
energy is such an important determinant o f the 
quality of individual life and of the way we relate 
to each other as individuals. But this does not 
make energy important,in political terms, in itself. 
The basic political issues are how to build a new 
society in which everyone is entitled to a just share 
in the material wealth o f the society and can 
participate fully and equally in making decisions 
about their society. Energy fundamentalism 
makes the mistake of forgetting that these are the 
basic issues, and instead, in advocating all sorts of 
political, social and economic changes, gives the 
reduction of energy use as the sole or principal 
reason.
Unfortunately, Seeds fo r  change is permeated 
by energy fundamentalist thinking, which 
detracts and distracts from the really important 
things it has to say. Although the authors do not 
allow themselves to acknowledge it, the book is 
really about how to transform the quality of life in 
Australia’s major cities, focussing on Melbourne 
as a specific example. In their words, it is about 
how to create “ convivial community” . They 
advocate a radical reorganisation o f the spatial 
distribution of activities in the metropolitan area, 
focussing all activities where people interact 
outside the family unit in a hierarchy of 
neighbourhood, local and district nodes, linked by 
a fast, frequent and comprehensive public 
transport system.
I found their account an exciting blueprint for 
liveable cities. But I was not a little surprised to 
find that the only reference to the hideous toll of
death or injury which our present car based 
transport system exacts was in the context of the 
energy used by ambulance, hospital and legal 
services. Death and injury on the roads are alone 
reason enough to change the system. That they 
result in extra energy consumption is, to my mind, 
irrelevant. This is an example of what I mean by 
energy fundamentalism.
To be fair to the authors, they do explain why 
they place such great emphasis on energy use and 
how to reduce it. In essence, their argument is that 
Australia, and spt 'ifically Victoria, is going to run 
out o f all fossil fuels within, at most, a few decades. 
In other words, they foresee an energy crisis that is 
far more severe and far more imminent than is 
generally thought.
Let me explain. For oil, the argument is fairly 
obvious. Everyone agrees that the Bass Strait 
reserves are limited, that production has now 
reached a plateau level, and tha t dom estic supplies 
(nearly all from Bass Strait) will form a decreasing 
proportion of total consumption in years to come 
unless growth in oil consumption creases. All the 
natural gas used in Victoria comes from Bass 
Strait, which supplies no other market. If growth 
in consumption continues at the rates projected by 
such authorities as the Gas and Fuel Corporation, 
then supply problems may be expected before 1990. 
However, a look at the basis o f these projections 
shows that they assume a continuance o f rates of 
growth that have been experienced in the years 
since 1970, a period during which gas has become 
established in Victoria at the expense of oil, and 
has, moreover, been ridiculously cheap — so cheap 
that even the m ost modest conservation 
expenditure by consumers has been uneconomic. 
The high growth rates also depend on the wasteful 
use of gas to generate electricity in the Newport 
and Jeeralang power stations. If, by contrast, gas 
consumption grows at more moderate rates, say 1 
or 2% per annum, then the shortfall would not 
appear for at least 30 years.
The argument with respect to brown coal is 
somewhat similar. They say that at consumption 
growth rates of zero or 1% per annum, the reserves 
in the Latrobe Valley will last a very long time, 
certainly more than a century. But if  one takes the 
very high growth projections (hopes?) for 
electricity consumption put forward by the SECV, 
and adds to it the extravagant demands for brown 
coal that vast liquefaction (to replace imported oil) 
and gasification (to replace exhausted Bass Strait 
gas) projects would impose, then the lifetime of 
Victorian brown coal is indeed drastically reduced. 
Now it is true that such proposals have been made 
by so-called energy planners in the Victorian 
bureaucracy. But the existence of the proposals 
does not prove that Victoria faces an imminent 
fuel crisis on all fronts. Rather it proves how idiotic 
official energy plans are.
In my opinion, sensible energy planning for
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Victoria would involve, with respect to natural 
gas, scrapping Newport and Jeeralang, and 
raising the price to industrial consumers so that it 
was just less than the price of competing petroleum 
fuels on an equivalent energy basis. For brown 
coal, any plans for conversion to liquid or gaseous 
fuels should be thrown in the waste paper basket. 
Having done that, crisis problems on the energy 
front would recede, and one could set about 
planning for progressively greater energy 
conservation and the gradual transfer to a 
renewable energy economy. Such energy policies 
would be one item on a whole slate o f changes that 
would accompany the transformation to a 
socialist society. Changes in urban structure and 
transport systems of the type described in this 
book would, in all probability, be another item on 
the agenda. But one woulii want such changes in 
their own right, not because they reduced energy 
consumption, though that would be an additional 
benefit.
I may appear to have been labouring the 
arguments. If so, it is because I think the vision 
contained in Seeds fo r  change is powerful and 
im p orta n t and I fear th at the energy 
fundamentalist context in which it is placed will 
discourage many readers. Two other aspects make 
this a difficult book to read. One is its length, much 
of which, unfortunately is the result of repetition 
and excessive detail. Reduced to about two thirds, 
the book would have lost none of its message and 
gained greatly in impact and readability.
Another characteristic, which I found somewhat 
irritating, was its parochialism. It is an excellent 
idea to take a particular city, Melbourne, as the 
basis for elaborating a blueprint. But to analyse 
the energy supply and demand pattern purely in 
terms of “ Victoria’s energy prospects” is another 
matter. One of the greatest obstacles to achieving 
sensible energy policies is the federal constitution 
which gives almost all powers over energy to the 
States. It is State powers which are responsible for 
the present absurdly low price of gas in Victoria, 
which constitutes perhaps the greatest single 
energy policy anomaly in Australia today. And it 
is state powers which enable Court and Bjelke- 
Petersen to flog off Australian resources at 
giveaway prices and to compete with each other 
and with the Victorian government to sell energy 
to the international aluminium cartel companies 
at the lowest possible prices. In discussing the 
greater use o f liquid petroleum gas, the authors 
appear to believe that it is the Victorian 
government which allows Esso-BHP to sell most o f 
what they produce to Japan, whereas, o f course, 
the export control power is one of the very few 
useful levers that the Australian government has 
on energy policy.
My complaints may seem carping, but I think 
such parochialism is poor political tactics. 
Speaking of Bass Strait oil, the authors concede 
that “ it is only reasonable that Victoria should
export oil to other States” . But it is not impossible 
to envisage a reactionary, Canberra-hating State 
government in years to come having different 
views.
What else does the book contain? Apart from the 
chapters on urban form and transport which, as I 
have already indicated, are excellent, there are two 
very good chapters on energy efficient buildings 
and urban design. The chapter on urban water 
supply, drainage and sewerage is also good if  you
can ignore the energy context into which, in 
keeping with the book’s whole approach, it is 
illogically forced. The final chapter, entitled “The 
seeds are there” describes a number of projects in 
M elbourne w here peop le  are “ crea tin g  
community” . It shows the task of transforming 
our cities can and should start from the bottom. 
This is the closest the book gets to questions o f 
political strategy. I am sure that the authors would 
be the first to acknowledge that the task of 
transformation must be carried out at all levels 
and that Esso-BHP and the SECV cannot, 
unfortunately, be simply by-passed and left to 
wither away.
Seeds fo r  C hange should not be criticised for 
avoiding these political problems. The authors see 
the book as “ a first step towards widespread 
discussion o f the technical, social, economic and 
political issues related to energy” . As a 
contribution to the energy debate its good points 
are marred by some factual errors and misleading 
arguments. But as a contribution towards the task 
of transforming our cities and hence the lives o f 
the majority o f Australians it is a splendid start
The Second Slump: A  Marxist Analysis 
o f  Recession in the Seventies, by Ernest 
Mandel. New Left Books, London, 1978.
In his major study Late C apitalism , Ernest 
Mandel undertook the task begun by Marx in the 
G rundrisse and Capital o f providing an 
integrated historical and theoretical analysis of 
the development of the capitalist mode o f 
production. This work with its rigorous usage o f 
marxian economic categories (which avoided both 
monocausal reductionist explanations and the 
abstract utilisation o f Marx’s reproduction 
schemas) constituted the first systematic marxist 
account o f what may be termed the three 
fundamental conjunctures of 20th century 
capitalism: (I) the transition from competitive to 
m onopoly capitalism  (1890-1935); (2) the 
consolidation o f monopoly capitalism (1936-1965):
(3) the coming crisis of monopoly capitalism (1966­
...).
With the publication of The Second  Slump 
Mandel has. attempted to deepen the analysis 
developed in his earlier work through a detailed 
account of the circumstances precipitating the
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1974-7 b recession and the subsequent period of 
limited and non-cumulative recovery. In doing this 
Mandel incorporates two levels of analysis into his 
work. On the one hand, the origins o f the present 
crisis are traced to the forces responsible for 
eroding the underlying preconditions that 
generated the long wave o f expansion during the 
1948-1968 period. On the other hand, Mandel 
situates the historically specific conditions which 
transformed a cyclical crisis of overproduction 
into a structural crisis of generalised recession 
which spread throughout the international 
capitalist system.
Mandel argues that the end o f the long wave of 
post-war expansion is a direct consequence of two 
inter-related tendencies. First, the “technological 
profits” (“ surplus profits originating from 
advances in productivity based on technical 
improvements, discoveries and patents” ) which 
were made possible by the third technological 
revolution (semi-automation, cybernetics, nuclear 
power) have begun to decline or, in certain 
instances, disappeared altogether. This 
generalised erosion o f productivity gains (see 
table, column 3) has reversed the trend towards a 
cheapening o f the elements of fixed constant 
capital. With ever greater levels of investment 
required to raise productivity a given amount, the 
organic composition of capital has tended to rise 
more rapidly initiating a tendency towards the 
formation o f long-term average profit rates below 
the levels achieved in the 1950s and ’60s.
The second tendency that Mandel sees as 
contributing to the end o f the long wave of 
expansion has been the strengthening and 
increasing militancy of the working class (see 
column 6) which has inhibited the successful 
implementation o f various ruling class strategies 
for increasing the rate o f surplus value in order to 
offset the fall in the rate of profit, Mandel 
attributes this primarily to the high levels of 
employment in the post-war period which 
dim inished the d iscip lin ing effects o f  the 
industrial reserve army. He argues that the 
resurgence of mass unemployment (see column 1) 
has not yet checked the downward pressure 
exerted on the growth o f relative surplus value (as 
partially reflected in increasing unit labor costs 
and diminishing productivity (see columns 3 and 
4).
But for Mandel it is the “combination of the 
classical overproduction crisis with the reversal of 
the long wave” (p. 181) which accounts for the 
contradictions inherent within capitalism today. 
The pros and cons of the analysis offered in The 
Second Slump resides in his attempt to show how 
this “combination” has brought about the 
synchronisation o f the international industrial 
cycle, the intensification of imperialist rivalry, the 
inflationary nature o f the limited recovery, the 
emergence of new trends in the merging of
banking and industrial capital, and the 
weakening o f the processes affecting the 
restructuring of capital.
In very general terms, the main thrust of 
Mandel’s argument may be summarised in the 
following manner. The “ fundamental cause of the 
recession” was the fall in the average rate ofprofit, 
accompanied by a cyclical crisis of overproduction 
which became generalised after being “detonated” 
by the slump in the auto and construction 
industries. The normal tendency for profitability 
to decline during the downswing of the business 
cycle was compounded by several additional 
pressures. First, the previously mentioned 
reversing of the tendency towards cheapening the 
elements of fixed constant capital. Secondly, an 
additional profit squeeze brought on by working 
class militancy. And thirdly, the movement o f the 
terms of trade in favor o f the primary producers 
(1972-74) which slowly then rapidly (oil price 
increases) brought about a rise in the costs of the 
circulating portion o f constant capital.
With extensive empirical data showing that the 
falling rate of profit preceded the oil price 
increases, Mandel argues that the latter, while not 
causing or detonating the recession (owing to the 
manner in which the O.P.E.C. surplus was 
recirculated through investments and increased 
imports rather than being hoarded) accentuated 
its impact by augmenting costs and liquidity thus 
“ advancing the moment at which inflation began 
to have negative effects” .
With mounting inflationary pressures (see 
column 2), a product o f the rapid expansion of 
private and public debt, and the emergence of a 
Keynesian induced credit cycle “ partially 
independent of the industrial cycle” to offset the 
tendency of overproduction, the capitalist system 
absorbed a further crisis tendency with the 
collapse o f  the Bretton Woods system. With the 
decline of the dollar and uncontrolled exchange 
rate fluctuations aimed at m aintaining 
in te rn a tio n a l co m p e tit iv e n e ss , and the 
diminishing effects of the third technological 
revolution placing additional pressure on the 
ability o f the system to maintain the levels of 
productive capacity built up during the long boom, 
national governments began to simultaneously 
pursue anti-inflationary measures.
The combined effects o f these developments 
a cce lera ted  the m ovem en t tow ard s the 
synchronisation o f the international industrial 
cycle, culminating in the generalised recession of 
the world system (the “ so called socialist 
countries” excepted [pp. 147-56]). Where once the 
uneven periodization of business cycles in 
different nation states facilitated various means 
for an export led recovery by countries in the midst 
o f recession, the generalised and simultaneous 
downturn of the cycle has restricted this 
p o s s ib ility  and re in fo rced  three b a s ic
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contradictions inhibiting the recovery. First, the 
possibilities o f a generalised recovery have been 
offset by increasing protectionism and the relative 
decline of US hegemony in the face o f an insurgent 
and increasingly indebted third world, and the 
challenge to American predominance in the field 
of capital and commodity exports by Europe and 
Japan. Secondly, the massive credit injections 
used to induce the recovery, have not sufficiently 
augmented the level o f investment or the 
reabsorption of surplus capacity {see columns 7 
and 8), To bring about a capital spending boom 
that is more than mere replacement demand will 
require a major restructuring of capital and the 
international division o f labor. This process of 
rationalisation is underway today, and constitutes 
the thrid contradiction, the intensification of the 
class struggle with the determination o f the rate of 
surplus value at stake.
T he S e co n d  S ljim p is certainly more 
comprehensive than this brief overview suggests, 
but it also suffers from several major limitations. 
A general criticism of Mandel’s work (besides his 
tendency to subsume the class struggle within “the 
unfolding laws of motion o f capital” ) has been his 
failure to specify whether the falling rate of profit 
is the parent or offspring of an overproduction 
crisis and whether and how these elements 
combine differently during various periods of 
econom ic crisis. While not disputing the 
importance of this critique, it generally neglects 
Mandel’s method of focussing on different 
combinations o f “ long waves of capitalist 
development” with the “normal” yet historically 
specific 7-10 year cycle, thus subjecting the 
relationship between the falling rate o f profit and 
overproduction to a dual determination. And it is 
this dual determination which becomes decisive in 
determining the extent to which the crisis provides 
the preconditions for a sustained recovery.
In the present context o f a hesitant recovery, 
amidst high levels of inflation and unemployment, 
marked by a sharp increase in profitability 
wi thout a sustained recovery in capi tal investment 
or capacity utilisation (and with the next recession 
in the US just around the corner), this approach of 
Mandel’s generates a fundamentally important 
hypothesis:
Precisely because the anti-crisis practices o f 
governments once again succeeded in limiting 
the duration and depth o f the recession, 
although less so than in the past; and precisely 
because the bourgeois state did refloat many 
banks, finance companies and major trusts 
that found themselves on the brink o f 
bankruptcy, the recession did not play the 
traditional objective role o f  capitalist crises .... 
A profound process o f 'pruning‘ the system, 
with a sharp new rise in the rate o f profit 
through the devalorisation and massive 
destruction o f capital simply did not take place
.... 1 nat. is why the recession o f 1974-75 was not 
followed by a new boom. (pp. 78-82.)
Unfortunately, a major weakness o f The 
Second Slump is its failure to deal with this 
phenomenon in detail. To do so would involve 
showing how the “ Com bination o f  the 
overproduction crisis with the reversal of the long 
wave” advanced the moment at which an increase 
in the proportion o f small and medium sized firms 
going bankrupt in the crisis is no longer sufficient 
for the process of devalorisation and destruction o f 
c a p i t a l  v a l u e s  g i v e n  th e  i n c r e a s i n g  
internationalisation and concentration o f capital. 
That in order for the ‘pruning’ process to fulfil its 
function it becomes increasingly necessary (but 
politically problematical) for larger firms to go to 
the wall, or for branches of industry to experience a 
politically induced rationalisation of productive 
capacity.
The corollary of the crisis in the processes 
affecting the restructuring of capital is the crisis or 
coming crisis o f the mechanisms designed to 
restructure the mobilisation capacity of labor. 
With increasing levels o f investment required to 
augment the diminishing effects of the third 
technological revolution, and with the almost 
universal ruling class strategy of “ profits first, 
investment later” , the state has increasingly 
attempted to implement a three-fold policy 
program for raising the rate o f surplus value. This 
involves: (1) a transfer o f income from wages to 
profits through intervention in the industrial 
relations system; (2) with the massive increase in 
state expenditures (particularly in the 1965-75 
period [see column 5]) and despite increasing 
contradictions between the state’s accumulation 
and legitimation functions, an acceleration of the 
tendency to transfer expenditure benefits to 
capital and revenue burdens to labor; (3) the 
possibility of achieving the first two goals has 
required the maintenance and further refinement 
o f tripartite (capital-labor-state) formats o f 
representation and organisational technologies 
which increasingly have resulted in the formation 
of a newly emergent network o f interlocking party, 
state, and industrial relations apparatuses.
The hesitancy of the present recovery and the 
instability of this institutional framework as 
evidence by the collapse o f incomes policies and 
the refusal of the working class to preside over its 
own dem obilisation, has necessitated the 
reformulation of workable strategies for engaging 
in class struggle and frameworks o f analysis for 
understanding its historical dimensions. In regard 
to these problems and developments The Second 
Slump has very little to say. While constituting an 
important contribution to our understanding of 
capitalism in the 1970s, the task of analysing the 
changing nature of class struggle after the long 
boom has yet to be undertaken.
— Nixon Apple.
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Nosferatu, showing at the Village Twin, 
Double Bay (Sydney).
Dracula is one of those names which give rise to 
thoughts of yawning graves, ruined castles, 
creaking .coffins, middle-European accents and 
the terrified shrieks o f your schoolfriends in the 
back row of the pictures. Horror movies seemingly 
operate on the principle that every now and again 
we find entertainment in being scared out o f our 
wits, and are prepared to pay for the privilege.
The horror genre relies very heavily on classic 
frighteners like w olf men, vampires and 
Frankenstein monsters who prey on a vulnerable 
and hapless community and who are despatched 
by brave and forthright defenders of law and 
order. Secure in the knowledge that anti-social 
deviants have been routed, we can presumably 
sleep peacefully in our beds, an activity much less 
likely if we pondered the real anti-social forces in 
our midst.
At any rate, it is one o f the ironies of the genre 
that the originals o f these dread figures were seen 
by their creators not as preying monsters but as 
victims of the complacency, intolerance and 
stupidity of bourgeois society. Arguably, both 
F r a n k e n s t e i n  and  D r a c u l a ,  t h r o u g h  
circum stances not o f their choosing, find 
themselves isolated, loveless and misunderstood. 
Their unavailing quest for understanding and 
solace leads them to revenge themselves on the 
“normal” society which has selfishly and 
heartlessly rejected them.
Murnau’s expressionist classic, N osferatu 
(The Undead), also uses the vampire legend 
critically, an approach which is followed by 
contemporary German director, Werner Herzog in 
his version currently on release.
In Murnau’s N o s fe ra tu , a 19th century 
Bremen estate agent (Jonathan Harker) leaves his 
lovely wife and happy domestic idyll to cross the 
wild Carpathian mountains. His task: to negotiate 
a house sale with the strange, remote and dreaded 
Count Dracula. When the Count catches sight o f a 
locket cameo of Jonathan’s wife, he imprisons 
Harker and flees by coach and boat (accompanied 
by the coffins of unconsecrated soil which 
vampires need for daytime sleeping) across the 
Baltic to Bremen. Harker makes his escape and 
urgently hurries toward his hearth and home.
The Count arrives first, and makes good his 
presence in his city mansion while the rats who 
travelled in the coffins spread the plague in the 
town. In the face of this disaster, the city officials 
are competitive, carping and ineffectual, and the 
populace appears fearful but directionless. Only 
the doctor, who has knowledge of vampires, and 
the innocent, pure-of-heart Lucy — who is willing 
to sacrifice herself in order to entrap the vampire 
in the fatal rays of daylight — are capable of
defeating the undead menace. Harker arrives 
home to find the city saved, the vampire and the 
plague conquered through the unity o f knowledge 
and purity.
Some analysts have understood Murnau’s 1922 
film as an extended argument for vigilance 
against the post-war emergence of a “ strong man” 
like Hitler and the plague of national socialism. 
Others have seen in it the claim by the German 
“ mandarin” class (of which Murnau was a part), 
composed of the propertyless educated, the 
professionals — represented in N osferatu  by the 
doctor — for primacy. In this interpretation only 
the mandarins can save Weimar Germany beset 
by the twin evils o f a bumbling, squabbling, and 
outmoded aristocracy (the ineffectual Bremen 
officials) and the passive, feckless masses (the 
sheep-like Bremen populace). Whichever view you 
choose, Murnau's film is seen as highly political.
It is against this background that we consider 
Herzog’s N osferatu. Herzog is a prolific member 
o f the group of politically conscious West German 
filmmakers who came to prominence in the late 
’60s and ’70s. Although Herzog resists strongly the 
implication that his N osferatu is a “re-make” , it 
borrows scenes, shots and even framing from 
Murnau’s film. The contemporary N osferatu is, 
o f course, in color, but the dialogue, although 
spoken, is almost as sparse and stilted as in the 
earlier, silent version. Much of the film’s tension 
and interest arises from our constant comparison 
between present and previous versions, and in 
deciphering the differences between Murnau's and 
Herzog’s political commentary.
Herzog’s version is, if anything, bleaker. In this 
N osferatu, in contrast to Murnau’s, Harker 
succumbs to the Count’s need for blood, and 
arrives home, ill and an amnesiac, to a Weimar (an 
obvious political comment here) beseiged by the 
plague. The Count, as in the Murnau film, has 
arrived with coffins and rats and the city fathers 
once more appear both foolish and helpless. 
Meanwhile, Lucy lovingly tends her distressed 
husband. When approached by Count Dracula, 
who tells her of bis loveless life, she rejects the 
vampire. However, the situation in the plague- 
ridden town worsens — the profligate and 
promiscuous engage in joyless, despairing revels 
— and Lucy resolves to sacrifice herself in order to 
destroy the vampire. She proffers her neck to the 
Count, and in a much more overtly erotic scene 
than in the Murnau film, she keeps him at her 
bedside until the dawn’s rays kill him.
At this point the doctor rushes in, discovers the 
fatally wounded Count and, over Harker’s 
protests, drives a stake into the vampire’s heart. 
Harker then demands that the doctor be arrested 
for the murder of the Count, and in a Kafka-esque 
scene, a blustering, but somehow authoritative
— Continued on page 39.
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